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THE CHICAGO PLAN: INCENTIVE ZONING 
AND THE PRESERVATION OF 
URBAN LANDMARKS 
John ]. Costonis * 
Present legal methods for preserving America's architectural 
landmarks are being shown to be only minimally effective in pre­
serving landmarks located in high development sections of the na­
tion's cities. Professor Costonis examines the economic and legal 
reasons for the ineffectiveness of these ordinances. He then pro­
poses an alternative approach - the Chicago Plan - which promises 
to be a more effective solution to the landmark problem. After dis­
cussing in detail the features of the Plan, Professor Costonis goes 
on to examine and rebut the various legal challenges that might be 
brought against the Chicago Plan. 
" [ T] he issues really being raised concern the relationship of the 
city's past to its present, and what new construction gives a city in 
functional, societal and architectural, as well as economic, terms. 
Questions are being asked everywhere about institutional attitudes 
toward development objectives and the effect of rigid investment 
patterns. Ultimately, the problem is the quality of the urban en­
vironment and who is responsible for it." 
-Ada Louise Huxtable 1 
U RBAN landmarks merit recognition as an imperiled species alongside the ocelot and the snow leopard. Over fifty per 
cent of the 12 ,ooo buildings listed in the Historic American 
Buildings Survey, commenced by the federal government in 1933, 
have since been razed.2 The threat to the remainder continues 
undiminished as the recent loss of Chicago's Old Stock Exchange 
Building 3 and the precarious status of New York's Grand Cen-
*Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. 
A.B.  Harvard, 1959; LL.B . Columbia, 1965. 
The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of  Messrs. Jared 
Shlaes and John F. Hartray, Jr., with respect to the economics and urban design 
elements of the study discussed in this paper. He also expresses his gratitude to 
the National Trust for Historic Preservation and the Chicago Chapter Foundation 
of the American Institute of Architects for their financial support in this endeavor. 
Of course, the author remains solely responsible for any inaccuracies or distortions 
that the study may contain. 
1 Huxtable, Bank's Building Plan Sets Off Debate on 'Progress,' N.Y. Times, 
Jan. 1 7, 1971,  § 8, at l, col. 2.  
2 See Conti, Preserving the Past, Wall St. J. ,  Aug. 8,  1970, at l, col. x. 
3 The Old Stock Exchange B uilding was the work of Louis Sullivan and Dank­
mar Adler, two of the most accomplished practitioners o f  the internationally 
renowned Chicago School of Architecture. A precursor o f  the modern skyscraper, 
it has been favorably compared with the great palaces of Renaissance Italy in 
terms of its historic import. See Huxtable, The Chicago Style -On Its Way Out?, 
N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1970, § 2, at 27, col. x. The Chicago Landmark Commission, 
on two separate occasions during the period l970-7r, urged that the Exchange be 
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tral Terminal attest. 4 If this trend is not reversed, the nation at 
its bicentennial in 1976 will mourn the loss of an essential part 
of its architectural and cultural heritage rather than celebrate the 
visible evidence of its past. 
The demise of so many cherished buildings is a peculiarly 
American phenomenon. In part it reflects the national penchant 
for identifying change with progress, even at the cost of destroy­
ing the nation's links with its past. More fundamentally, however, 
it is the product of  a system that vests the initiative for most ur­
ban development decisions in private property owners, whose 
choices, predictably enough, are shaped by the necessities of the 
real estate market. The stubborn reality underlying the land­
marks dilemma is that landmark ownership in downtown areas of 
high land value is markedly less profitable than redevelopment 
of landmark sites. Hence there is an incessant trade-off - in­
jurious to the urban environment - of buildings of unique archi­
tectural distinction for glass and steel towers that are crammed 
with as much rentable floor area as local zoning permits and as 
the market will absorb. 
Over the last decade, American cities have adopted a variety 
of incentive zoning programs in a determined attempt to expand 
their leverage over private land use decisions.5 By modifying the 
economics of downtown development, these programs encourage 
development decisions that would normally be precluded by the 
harsh realities of the marketplace. Where successful, they have 
enabled cities to channel development in accordance with munici-
accorded formal landmark status, but the Chicago City Council on both occasions 
refused to accept the Commission's recommendation. A permit for the building's 
demolition was issued in October I97I. See Huxtable, Non-Fables for Our Time, 
N.Y. Times, Nov. I4, I97I, § 2, at 22, col. 4. 
4 The New York Central Railroad, as owner of the site of the Grand Central 
Terminal, sought in the early sixties to lease the air rights over the Terminal to a 
developer who in.tended to erect a second Pan-Am type building there. The New 
York City Landmarks Commission, however, refused to approve the project on 
the ground of its aesthetic incompatibility with the facade of the Terminal, a 
designated landmark. The New York Central responded by threatening to over­
turn the· Commission's action in the courts, but bankruptcy of its successor com­
pany, the Penn Central Company, and the softening of the New York City office 
space market have relieved the pressure on the Terminal, at least for the time 
being. See Address by Norman Marcus, First Conference on Legal Techniques in 
Preservation, in Washington, D.C., May 2, I970 (sponsored by National Trust for 
Historic Preservation) [hereinafter cited as Marcus]. 
5 See THE NEW ZONING: LEGAL, ADMINIS TRATIVE, AND ECONOMIC CoNcrPTS 
AND TECHNIQUES 1 25-238 (N. Marcus & M. Groves eds. I970) [hereinafter cited 
as NEW ZONING] ; Comment, Bonus or Incentive Zoning-Legal Implications, 2I 
SYR. L. REv. 895 (1970); cf. URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, NEW APPROACHES TO 
RESIDENTIAL LAND DEVELOPMENT: A STU DY OF CONCEPTS AND INNOVATIONS (Tech. 
Bull. No. 40, 1961). 
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pally selected urban design policies. Although these programs 
differ widely among themselves, they are all premised upon a 
trade between the city and the developer. The city relaxes its 
zoning bulk restrictions, 6 thereby allowing the developer to build 
more profitably by including more rentable floor area in his 
project than the prevailing zoning otherwise permits. In return 
the developer must either provide a public amenity, such as a 
plaza, at his own expense or make a cash payment that will en­
able the city to finance the purchase of a public improvement. 
How does the city derive the additional floor area that it allo­
cates to the developer? I f  the city seeks an amenity, it simply 
creates the floor area ex nihilo and bestows it upon the developer 
as a so-called "zoning bonus." The amount of the bonus is 
calculated to equal or slightly to exceed in value the cost that 
the developer incurs in providing the amenity. The case is more 
complicated where the city seeks to retain buildings, such as 
landmarks, that enrich its character. Recognizing that these 
buildings often fail to exhaust the floor area authorized for their 
sites under local zoning, the city allows their owners to sell their 
unused floor area to developer-owners of other sites, a practice 
commonly referred to as the "transfer of development rights." 
The cash carrot that results, it is hoped, will induce owners of the 
"underimproved" sites to forego demolition of their buildings. 
Zoning bonus programs have been enthusiastically received 
by private developers and by municipal governments .7 The re­
sponse to these programs in New York City, the nation's most 
innovative practitioner of incentive zoning, 8 is illustrative. Almost 
every major office or commercial development erected in Man­
hattan's central business district since adoption o f  the New York 
bonus provisions in 196 1  has included bonus space.9 The City has 
employed bonuses to enhance its Broadway theater,1° Lincoln 
6 Some communities might also relax use and tower coverage requirements and 
coordinate variance procedures for the miscellaneous minor adjustments that are 
necessitated by the grant of incerased floor area. Cf. Svirsky, San Francisco: 
The Downtown Development Bonus System, in NEw ZONING 139, 142-43. 
7 But see note 229 infra. 
. 
8 For a review of the various incentive zoning programs that have been adopted 
or considered in New York City, see Burks, City Wants Air Rights to Hop, Skip 
and Jump, N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1970, § 8, at l, col. l; Gilbert, Saving Land­
marks, HIST. PRESERVATION July-Sept. 1970, at 13; Marcus. 
9 NEW ZONING 201. 
10 NEW YORK, N .Y ., ZONING RESOLUTION art. VII, ch. r, § 81-00 et seq. 
(1971). This provision creates a Special Theater District that includes the area 
between 4oth and 57th Streets and 6th and 8th Avenues. Developers owning 
parcels within the District who agree to include a legitimate theater in their 
projects may receive an increase of up to 20 per cent in the floor area authorized 
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Center,11 and Fifth Avenue retail 12 districts. It is currently bank­
ing upon bonuses to induce private developers to provide a coor­
dinated network of physical facilities to service the traffic gen­
erated by its 10,000,000 square foot World Trade Center.13 And 
it has even proposed that bonuses be enrolled in the effort to 
encourage the production of moderate and low income housing.14 
Development rights transfer programs, on the other hand, 
have fared poorly. Again the New York experience is instructive. 
for their parcels under prevailing zoning. See Weinstein, How New York's Zoning 
Was Changed to Induce the Construction of Legitimate Theaters, in NEW ZONING 
13!. Plans for the construction of five theaters pursuant to the provision have 
been announced. See N.Y. Times, May 19, 1970, at 39, col. 2. 
11 NEW YoRK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION art. VIII, ch. 2, § 82-00 et seq. 
(1971). 
12 NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION art. VIII, ch. 7, 87-00 et. seq. 
(1971). This provision created a Fifth Avenue Retail District encompassing Fifth 
Avenue between 38th and 59th Streets. It mandates that the two lower floors of 
any building constructed within the District be used for retail purposes. Developers 
who elect to provide more than the minimum retail space will be given additional 
floor area to be used for apartments or hotel accommodations. 
13 NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION art. VIII, ch. 6, § 86-oo et seq. 
(1971), creates a Special Greenwich Street Development District encompassing a 
29 square block area between the World Trade Center and Battery Park. The 
District regulations include a map and a manual which prescribe a firm area net­
work of circula.tion features consisting of open and covered arcades, pedestrian 
bridges, subway connections, elevated plazas, and the like. Developers building 
within the District will be required to provide some of these features and may 
elect to provide others. In return for these features and for payment of sums into 
a subway improvement fund, developers will receive increases in the floor area 
authorized for their lots and may also be allowed to build towers that cover a 
greater amount of lot area than the zoning would otherwise permit. 
The District differs in two respects from New York's existing special districts. 
First, the desired features have been previously mapped so that every lot owner 
knows beforehand which mandatory and optional features he must or may provide 
in return for the increased floor area. Second, the area plan is so specific and the 
schedule of bonuses so precise that developers need not negotiate with the Plan­
ning Department, submit their development plans for site and design review, or 
secure a special permit, all of which are a part of the approval procedure under 
the regulations applicable to the other districts. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1970, § 
8, at 1, col. 1. See also Huxtable, Concept P1Jints to 'City of the Future,' N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 6, 1970, § 8, at 1, col. 3. 
14 The New York Planning Commission proposed the establishment of a Spe­
cial Development District on New York's Lower East Side that would contain 
2.355 apartments, of which 1,837 would be luxury class and 418, low income class. 
Developers were to be given the option either of providing 15 per cent of the units 
in their buildings for low income rental or of paying $15.30 per square foot of the 
lot area of their parcels into a special fund to be used to acquire public housing 
sites. They would have received an additional floor area authorization in return. But 
the proposal appears to have died as a result of opposition of community residents 
who saw ft as a "give-away" to developers and as a disguised means of displacing 
low income persons in the area. See N.Y. Times, May 13, 1970, at 40, col. I. 
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Although that city adopted a transfer program in 1968 15 that 
was designed to preserve its landmark buildings, the program has 
not as yet figured in a single executed transaction.16 A number 
of reasons account for its failure to win the confidence of land­
mark owners, real estate developers, and title insurers, as well 
as at least one member of the New York City Planning Com­
mission.17 Inadequate analysis of the economic burdens of land­
mark ownership and of the urban design consequences of develop­
ment rights transfers have hampered the program. Onerous 
administrative controls of dubious necessity have dampened the 
enthusiasm of the private sector for the program. And wholly 
apart from the merits of the New York program itself has been 
the uneasiness of its prospective participants concerning the 
underlying legality of the transfer mechanism. 
The object of this article is to offer a development rights 
transfer proposal, referred to herein as the Chicago Plan, 18 that 
will provide an effective foundation for municipal landmark pres­
ervation efforts. The article contains three sections. The first de­
tails the economic causes behind the grave attrition of America's 
urban landmarks and reviews the conventional legislative re­
sponses of the nation's cities to this threat. The second analyzes 
the use of development rights transfers to preserve urban land­
marks, examining the structure and deficiencies of the New York 
15 See N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1969, at 34, col. 4; NEw YORK , N.Y., ZONING RESO­
LUTION art. VII, ch. 4, §§ 74-79, 74-791 to -793 (1971). 
16 One transfer has almost taken place. All of the formalities relating to the 
transfer of the excess floor area of the Amster Yard, a designated landmark, have 
been completed, but the transaction  has been stalled by the softening of the New 
York office space market. See Huxtable, City Landmark Gets a Chance for Sur­
vival, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1970, § 8 ,  at l, col. l; Marcus. 
17 See p. 628 infra. 
18 Prior to the demolition of Chicago's Old Stock Exchange Building, the Na­
tional Trust for Historic Preservation and the Chicago Chapter Foundation of the 
American Institute of Architects commissioned the author and Jared Shlaes, a 
real estate consultant, to devise a transfer proposal that would safeguard the Ex­
change and Chicago's remaining architectural landmarks. The product of this study 
appeared as a report entitled Development Rights Transfers: A Solution to Chi­
cago's Landmarks Dilemma (Chicago Chapter Foundation of the American Insti­
tute of Architects & National Trust for Historic Preservation, May 13, 1971) 
[hereinafter cited as Chicago Report]. The Chicago Report contains a summary 
legal and economic analysis of the proposal discussed in this article. It also in­
cludes draft amendments to the Illinois Historic Preservation and Zoning Enabling 
Acts and to the Chicago Zoning Code that would permit implementation of the 
proposal. See Chicago Report apps. I, II & III. The proposed amendments to 
the state legislation have since been adopted. See Ill. Pub. A .  No. 77-1373 (Ill. 
Leg. Serv., Aug. 31, 1971), amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § II-13-1 (1969); 
Ill. Pub. A. No. 77-1372 (Ill. Leg. Serv., Aug. 31, 1971), in part to be codified 
at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § n-48.2-1A, in part amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 
24, § II-48.2-2 & -6 (1969). 
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transfer program and then the content of the Chicago Plan. The 
third addresses the issues that are likely to arise in a comprehen­
sive legal challenge to the validity of the Chicago Plan. 
I. THE PROBLEM: THE VANISHING URBAN LANDMARK 
A. Economics and Landmark Ownership 
The history of Chicago's Old Stock Exchange Building illus­
trates the economic vulnerability of urban landmarks. It was 
located in Chicago's Loop, an area in which most of the city's 
other architectural gems are concentrated and, ominously, an 
area of skyrocketing land values. Its height of thirteen stories 
exhausted less than one-third of the approximately forty-five 
stories authorized for its site under present zoning regulations. 
Hence, it realized a mere fraction of the rental income that a 
modern office tower would have r eturned if located o n  the same 
site. Its mechanical systems, interior space, and exterior walls 
were in need of substantial renovation. Even with refurbishing, 
moreover, the annual maintenance costs of the seventy-eight year 
old building would probably have exceeded those of its modern 
steel and glass competitors. Typical of other turn-of-the-century 
buildings, its interior space was carved up with courts, columns 
and other structural features that diminished its appeal to large 
corporate tenants.19 
Chicago's zoning bonus program intensified the Exchange's 
vulnerability. Like the programs of other cities, it is intended to 
encourage the provision of plazas, arcades, and other amenities. 
By awarding enormous premiums for projects occupying a half 
block or more,20 however, the program has brought development 
19 The competftive disadvantages suffered by urban landmarks should not be 
overstated, however. A review of income and operating expense data for Chicago 
office buildings revealed that, while maintenance-related expenses 
do tend to increase with the age of the building, [they] do not increase at 
such a rate as to impose unreasonable burdens upon older buildings as such. 
It is not apparent from national averages that buildings over 40 years 
old suffer from any striking competitive disadvantage ; indeed, they net 
more per square foot than buildings 2 5-40 years old on a national basis, 
perhaps because of special characteristics of buildings constructed during 
the depression and war years I930-45.  Net income before depreciation and 
capital charges for buildings over 40 years old is approximately 78% of the 
national average for all buildings but tends to approach $r.6o per square 
foot, indicating that these older buildings, while somewhat penalized by 
their age, are by no means functionally obsolete. 
Chicago Report 2r. See E. SHULTZ & W. SIMMONS, OFFICES IN THE SKY 88 
(I959) [hereinafter cited as OFFICES]. 
20 An example serves to illustrate the extent of these bonuses. CHICAGO, ILL., 
MUNICIPAL CODE, ZONING ORDINANCE ch. 194A, art. 8.5-6(5) (c) (I970) provides: 
On any zoning lot, for each floor above the ground floor which is set back 
from one or more lot lines, a premium equal to 0.4 times the open area of 
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on small lots to a standstill, and hastened the amalgamation of 
existing smaller holdings into assemblages that can exploit the 
program to best advantage. Ironically, therefore, the Exchange 
was as much the victim of the city's own zoning regulations as 
of the speculative motives of the building's owners.21 
If the Exchange's owners had been forced to maintain the 
Exchange as a landmark, they would thus have suffered several 
economic disadvantages. They would have been prevented from 
redeveloping the site or capitalizing on the site's premium value 
for assemblage purposes. Designation might also have precluded 
the owners from internal modernization of the Exchange that 
would have increased its return by increasing its operating effi­
ciency. They would also have been unable to obtain mortgage 
financing on terms competitive with those extended to the own­
ers of properties unencumbered by landmark designation. Fi­
nally, profitable operation of the landmark might have been 
eventually endangered as the building continued to age and the 
net income from operation progressively declined.22 
B. M umcipal Preservation Ordinances: 
An Inadequate R esponse 
In light of these factors, the conventional municipal ordi­
nance 23 offers scant hope of achieving the preservation of threat-
the lot at the level of such floor divided by the gross lot area may be added 
to the permissible floor area ratio . . . . 
The "floor area ratio" (FAR) is an integer prescribed by the ordinance for each 
bulk district, which, when multiplied by the area of the zoning lot, gives the 
amount of floor area that may be included in a building erected on that lot. Thus, 
if the district FAR is 101 the maximum floor space of a building erected on a 
lo,ooo square foot lot is 1001000 square feet. However, if the developer of this 
lo,ooo square foot site decided to leave 50% of his lot open when he constructed 
a building upon it, he would be entitled under the above-quoted provision to 
1401000 square feet of floor space. He would receive a premium of 0.4 times 0.5 
times the number of initial floors he was entitled to build (0.4 x 0.5 x 20), bringing· 
the FAR to 14. While the above-quoted provision theoretically has equal appli­
cation to large and small lots, in practice only large projects can benefit from it. 
There is little economic advantage in building tall buildings with a small base­
since too much of the space on each floor is devoted to nonrentable uses, such as 
elevator and support constructions. 
21 See note 229 infra. 
22 The economic consequences of designation are not entirely negative. Its. 
prestige factor could operate to attract stable, high quality tenants and to reinforce 
pride of ownership which would be reflected in the marketplace. See Hearings 
Before the Commission on Chicago Architectural and Historical Landmarks Con­
cerning the Designation of the M onadnock Building as an Official Chicaga Land­
mark 90 (Apr. 1970) (on file with the Commission on Chicago Historic and 
Architectural Landmarks). Moreover, designation makes space in a landmark. 
attractive to tenants who wish to avoid relocation and other vagaries of the de­
velopment process. 
23 State and local landmarks legislation and programs are reviewed in J. MoR-
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ened urban landmarks. The typical ordinance calls for the des­
ignation of individual landmarks, such as the Exchange, and 
of entire historic districts, such as New Orleans' Vieux Carre.24 
The ordinance enumerates the cultural, aesthetic, and historic 
criteria that the city landmark commission, often with the advice 
of the city planning commission, must take into account in pro­
posing designation of individual buildings or historic districts.25 
Actual designation, however, generally rests with the legislative 
body.26 
After designation, permits for demolition or significant alter­
ation of individual landmarks or of buildings within historic 
districts require the approval of the landmarks commission.27 If 
the commission withholds its consent, it then has a grace period 28 
in which to devise a compromise plan acceptable to the landmark 
owner that will safeguard the structure. If the owner rejects 
the plan, some ordinances authorize the commission to deny the 
permit outright regardless of economic hardship 29 while others 
require approval in such cases.30 In most cities, however, the 
RISON, HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW (I965 ) ;  J. PYKE, LANDMARK PRESERVATION 
(Citizens Union Research Foundation, Inc., 1970) ; Wilson, The Response of State 
Legislation to Historic Preservation, 36 LAw & CONTEMP. -PROB. No. 3 (to be 
published) ; Wolfe, Conservation of Historic Buildings and Areas - Legal Tech­
niques, in 2 ABA SECTION ON REAL PROP., .PROBATE, & TRUST LAW PROCEEDINGS 
18 (1963);  Note, The Police Power, Eminent Domain and the Preservation of 
Historic Property, 63 CoLUM. L. REV. 708 ( 1 963); Note, The Landmark Problem 
in New York, 22 N.Y .U. INTRAMURAL L. REV. 99 ( 196 7 ) ;  Comment, Landmark 
Preservation Laws: Compensation for Tem porary Taking, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 362 
(1968). 
24 See, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 21-64 (a) (1970) ; Mobile, Ala. 
Ordinance 87-036, Mar. 20, 1 962 ; NEW ORLEANS, LA., CODE § 65-6 ( 1956) . 
25 See, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 2 1-64 (b) ( 1970) ; NEW YORK. 
N.Y., AoMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 8-A, § 207-r.oh & k ( 1 97 1 ) .  
26 See, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 2 1-64(f) (1970 ) .  The Ne" 
York ordinance allows the Landmark Commission to designate landmarks ; its 
decision, however, may be overridden or modified by the Board of Estimate. See 
NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 8-A, § 20 7-2 .of ( 2 )  ( 1 97 1 ) .  
27 See, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 21-64.I ( 1970) ; NEW YORK, 
N.Y., AoMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 8-A, §§ 207-4.0 to -8.o ( 1 97I) ; CHARLESTON, S.C., 
CODE§§ 51-28 to -3 0 ( 1 966 ) .  
28 The usual period is 180  days. See, e.g., Mobile, Ala., Ordinance 87-036, 
Mar. 20, 1962 (6 months) ; CHARLESTON, S.C., CODE § 51-30(4) (1966) . But see 
Los Angeles, ·Cal., Ordinance 1 2 1 ,971,  Apr. 30, 1962 (up to 360 days ) . 
29 See, e.g., NEW ORLEANS, LA., CODE § 65-10 ( 1956) ; CHARLESTON, S. C., 
CODE§ 51-30 ( 1 966) .  
30 See, e.g., Mobile, Ala., Ordinance 87-036, Mar. 20 ,  1962.  
The New York City Landmarks Ordinance contains a unique provision that 
authorizes outright denial of a permi't for alteration or demolition in the case of 
designated landmarks whose owners either receive state or local tax relief or ob­
tain a "reasonable return" - identified as a 6% return on the assessed valuation 
of the property. NEW YORK, N.Y., AoMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 8-A, §§ 207-1 .oq, 
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landmark commission has no power after this grace period to 
stay the demolition or alteration of a landmark, but can only 
recommend that the legislature acquire or condemn the threat­
ened building.31 
These ordinances have proven useful in preserving both build­
hJ.gs that are within historic districts and landmarks that are out­
side of high land value areas. These structures usually hold little 
interest for speculators because they tend to be smaller, easily 
maintained residential structures located in low density zones. 
In fact, at times owners of  buildings within historic districts will 
welcome designation for the prestige it lends to the neighborhood 
and for its beneficial impact upon land values there.32 Few owners 
of these buildings litigate permit denials because the prospects 
for financial gain through demolition or alteration seldom off set 
the costs and delays of a legal challenge.33 
The picture differs dramatically for landmarks located on 
downtown parcels. The gap between the income potential of 
these parcels as presently developed and as improved to their 
most profitable use is such that few owners - speculators or 
otherwise 34 - warmly embrace designation . The typical response 
of an owner who contemplates redeveloping his site is to force 
the city's hand by demanding that it either acquire the property 
outright or issue a demolition permit forthwith.35 
207-8.0 (1971). By setting the return at this relatively low rate, see Comment, 
The Landmark Problem in New York, supra note 23, at 107, and requiring the 
landmark owner to come forward with rather precise evidence establishing the 
economic burden entailed by designation, the ordinance enables the city's Land­
mark Commission to exert considerably greater leverage in dealing with landmark 
owners than commissions in other cities enjoy. 
31 See, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 21-64.2 (1970); CHARLESTON, 
S.C., CODE § 51-30(7) (1966). 
32 See, e.g ., N. Y. Times, May 27 ,  1970, at 35, col. 3;  Chicago Sun-Times, Oct. 
22, 1970, at 3, col. 2. 
33 In 1970, the author surveyed preservation agencies in 12 representative cities 
to obtain the.ir appraisals of the efficacy of their ordinances. The agencies were 
generally enthusiastic about their success in administering historic districts, but 
many suggested that nonlegal factors, such as those mentioned in the text, ac­
counted for their success. 
The agencies were far less sanguine about their efforts in safeguarding indi­
vidual landmarks. All noted that their city governments assigned a relatively low 
priority to historic preservation, especially if  the latter necessitated the expenditure 
of general revenues. Few instances of the use of eminent domain or the purchase 
of threatened properties on behalf of these agencies were reported. Although at 
least four of the cities are authorized by state law to accord real estate tax abate­
ment to official landmarks, moreover, only one city was actually doing so. 
34 The stakes are so high where downtown properties are concerned that even 
those institutions that want to "do the right thing," such as museums, churches 
and service organizations, also balk at designation. See The Chicago Style, note 3 
supra. 
35 The position of the Building Managers of Chicago (BMA) is representative 
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The city's options when the gauntlet is thrown down are 
not enviable. Even those landmark commissions that have the 
power to deny a demolition or alteration permit are unlikely to 
do so. The constitutionality of provisions authorizing such de­
nials is dubious; 36 moreover, political pressures from downtown 
developers make such an action by the commission improbable 
in many cities. On the other hand, condemnation is also unlikely. 
Other demands of greater priority preclude most cities from 
expending the enormous sums required for the acquisition o f  
downtown properties.37 Nor would the city's costs end with 
of the views of most downtown building owners and managers in the United 
States. In the BMA's view: 
(WJe can see no way to accomplish [the preservation of urban landmarks] 
unless the City, State or Federal Government purchase the property in 
question, spend large amounts of money toward rehabilitation and be [sic] 
prepared to operate the property, possibly at a loss . 
. . . [TJhe more we study the subject . . .  the more we are convinced that 
the only solution is for a Government agency to purchase the building and 
maintain it. The willingness of some Government agency to purchase should 
be ascertained before proceedings are instituted to designate a building as 
a landmark so as to avoid unnecessary harm to the owner. 
Letter from Richard M. Palmer, President, BMA, to Samuel A. Lichtmann, 
Chairman, Commission on Chicago Historical and Architectural Landmarks, Aug. 
6, 1970. For similar views in New York, see N. Y. Times, May 27, 1970, at 35, 
col. 3; N.Y. Times, Apr. 29 , 1970, at 27, col. 3. 
36 Courts have consistently held that landmark preservation statutes may not 
impose undue economic hardships on landmark owners, and that in cases of undue 
economic hardship the city must either acquire the building or permit its demoli­
tion. See, e.g., People ex rel. Marbro Corp. v. Ramsey, 28 Ill. App. 2d 252, 171 
N.E. 246 (1960); In re Opinion of the Justices, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 
(1955) ; cf. note 93 infra. Thus, the imposition of permanent landmark status on 
a building that is currently unprofitable seems clearly unconstitutional. On the 
other hand, the constitu'tionality of ordinances such as New York's, see note 
30 supra, that do allow permanent designation if the landmark is returning 
a net profit of 6% of assessed valuation is less clear. While "undue economic 
hardship" is perhaps not normally thought to apply to ownership of buildings 
that return a profit, it is certainly arguable that in cases where the landmark 
owner is forced by designation to forego a vastly more profitable sale of his site 
the foregone opportunity constitutes such a hardship. See Comment, The Land­
mark Problem in New York , supra note 23, at 104. 
37 The Committee feels that the aesthetic value of the Old Stock Exchange 
Building does not exceed the relative cost and, in this day of demand to meet 
urgent financial needs in other areas, the City of Chicago cannot afford 
the luxury of a building as a landmark that, though it may be treasured 
for historic value and architectural originality, is too far deteriorated to 
warrant the cost of rehabilitation. The Committee is confident that the 
people of the City of Chicago would want be.tter application of their tax 
�ollars for we are convinced of a resultant dollar deficiency if rehabilita­
tion were attempted - the building would become known as Chicago's White 
Elephant. 
Committee on Cultural and Economic Development, Special Report Relative to 
Designation of the Old Stock Exchange Building 6 (August 1970) (advising the 
Chicago City Council to reject the l,andmark Commission's recommendation that 
the Old Stock Exchange be designated). 
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acquisition. The building may require substan.
tial .refur
bishing 
in addition to ordinary maintenance. Removmg 
it from the 
municipal tax roll will deny the city not only the incre
ased taxes 
that the proposed project would yield,38 but also the tax
es. �ur­
rently being returned by the landmark property. In ad
dition, 
redevelopment of the landmark site with a n_iodern str�ct�r.e 
may 
benefit the general economic health of the city by rev1tahzmg an
 
entire block or district.39 
II. THE SEARCH FOR AN ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC 
FRAMEWORK: LANDMARK PRESERVATION 
THROUGH DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS TRANSFERS 
Conventional preservation ordinances have failed to safe­
guard urban landmarks because they ignore the economic reali­
ties that lie at the heart of the landmarks dilemma. Owners will 
not and cities cannot shoulder the full costs o f  preservation. 
Resolution of this dilemma requires enlarging the present eco­
nomic framework to include other p articipants who will them­
selves assume a major share of these costs. The most obvious 
solution, of course, would be to spread the costs of preservation 
to all taxpayers within the city by a general levy. But political 
obstacles rule out this approach at the present time: 40 the corol­
lary to the refusal of American cities to spend for preservation 41 
is their unwillingness to tax for this purpose. 
If preservation efforts are to have any chance of success, 
therefore, another basis of cost allocation must be found that 
does not threaten to drain the city's general revenues. New York 
City's effort to redistribute these costs through development 
rights transfers constitutes a giant s tep in this direction.42 To 
date, however, that effort has not borne fruit. A n  examination 
38 The differences between the taxes presently received on the Old Stock 
Exchange and a new 45-story tower on its site, for example, are estimated at 
$640,000 per year. See Conti, supra note 2. 
39 Lewis Hill, Commissioner of the Chicago Planning Department and a mem­
ber of the Landmark Commission, voted against designation of the Old Stock 
Exchange on the ground that: 
It
_ 
remains my judgment that the designation of this building will not con­tribute t<;> the strengthening of LaSalle Street as the great economic center of the mid-west. 
Le�ter fro� L:wis W. Hill to Samuel A. Lichtmann, Chairman, Commission on 
Chicago H1stoncal and Architectural Landmarks March 17 1971 
40 See note 33 supra. 
' 
' · 
4 � See id; c
.
L �lliot, Introduction. t o  NEW ZONlNG at xv (cities lack capital required to mamtam or enhance amenity level o f  urban areas) 42N 
y 
· 
EW ORK, N,-Y., �ON�G RESOLUTION art. VII, ch. 4, § §  74_79, 74_791 to -793 (1971),- _
The d1scuss10n m the following two paragraphs o f  the text is based on the prov1s1ons of these statutes. 
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of the reasons for its lack of success has given rise to the rather 
different transfer proposal discussed in this article. The follow­
ing paragraphs summarize the New York transfer program, cata­
log its defects, and then turn to a detailed examination of the 
Chicago Plan. 
A. Transfers Under the New York Zoning Resolution 
New York landmark owners may transfer the authorized but 
unbuilt floor area of their landmarks to adjacent lots in certain 
districts within the city. The "authorized but unbuilt floor area" 
that may be transferred is determined by multiplying the lot area 
of a landmark by a factor, known as a floor area ratio (FAR), 
that differs for the city's various bulk districts.43 From this 
product is subtracted the floor area already exhausted by the 
landmark. An adjacent lot is defined as one that is contiguous 
to or across a street or intersection from a landmark lot ; it may 
also be one of a series of lots that connect with the landmark 
lot, provided that all of these lots are in single ownership. Al­
though in most zones the floor area of the transferee lot may not 
be increased by more than twenty per cent above its authorized 
level, no limit is set for transferee lots in high density commercial 
zones. Transfers may be made to one or several lots until the 
excess floor area is exhausted. Once transferred, the excess floor 
area is irrevocably withdrawn from the authorized floor area o f  
the landmark lot. 
Procedures for obtaining approval of a proposed transfer 
are complex. First, the New York Landmark Commission must 
examine the plans for the development which will utilize the 
transferred development rights in order to determine whether 
the new development's materials, design, scale, and location are 
compatible with the landmark. The owners of the landmark and 
the transferee lot must then apply to the New York Planning 
Commission for preliminary approval of the transfer. Accom­
panying this application must be a site plan for both lots show­
ing the proposed development o f  the adjoining lot, a program for 
continuing maintenance of the landmark, and a report o f  the 
Landmark Commission detailing the effect of the proposed trans­
fer upon the landmark. The Planning Commission must then 
decide whether the transfer will have unduly detrimental effects 
on the occupants of buildings in the vicinity of the transferee 
lot and whether the proposed maintenance program will in fact 
result in preservation of the landmark. If the Planning Com-
43 For a detailed evaluation of the FAR system, see OFFICES 280-82; Note; 
Building Size, Shape, and Placement Regulations: Bulk Control Zoning Reex­
amined, 60 YALE L.J. 506 (1951). 
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mission recommends approval, the application then goes to the 
Board of Estimate, which has final authority to grant or deny 
the application. The difficulties of obtaining transfer approval 
are further complicated by the power of the Planning Commission 
in certain instances to condition approval of the transfer upon 
provision of an amenity by the development rights purchaser; 
in these cases, the Planning Commission must approve the pur­
chaser's submission for the amenity as well. 
Despite the ingenuity evident in its conception, the New 
York initiative contains at least five drawbacks that have crip­
pled its effectiveness as a v ehicle for a comprehensive municipal 
preservation program. Heading the list is the absence of a ra­
tional incentive structure for inducing landowners to agree to 
preserve their landmarks. By limiting development rights trans­
fers to adjacent lots, the program imposes severe restraints upon 
the potential market for these rights. Existing zoning in New 
York and other cities already permits developers to shift unused 
floor area to contiguous parcels.44 Hence, the plan is useful only 
44 The New York Zoning Resolution defines the term "zoning lot" to include 
the following: 
( c) A tract of land, located within a single block, which at the time of 
filing for a building permit . . .  is designated by its owner or developer as 
a tract all of which is to be used, developed, or built upon as a unit under 
single ownership. A zoning Jot, therefore, may or may not coincide with a 
lot as shown on the official tax maps of the City of New York or on any 
recorded subdivision pla·t or  deed. 
For the purposes of this definition, ownership of a zoning lot shall be 
deemed to include a lease of not less than 50 years duration, with an option 
to renew such lease so as to provide a total lease of not less than 75 years 
duration. 
NEw YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION art. I, ch. 2, § 12-10 (1971 ) .  See CHICAGO, 
!LL., MUNICIPAL CODE, ZONING ORDINANCE ch. 194A, art. 3 .2  (1970) . Under these 
provisions a developer may increase the authorized floor area on the project site 
by obtaining a long-term lease on an underimproved or vacant adjacent site, 
designating both that site and the project site as a single "zoning lot,'' and shifting 
the unused floor area from the former to the latter. 
One hundred thousand square feet of excess floor area authorized for the site 
of the Appellate Division Courthouse, a New York landmark, were transferred to 
an adjacent project site pursuant to § 12-10 and without the aid of § 74-79, the 
landmark transfer provision, which, at the time of the transaction, was not appli­
cable to publicly owned landmarks. A developer, desiring to incorporate the ad­
ditional floor area into his project on the adjacent site, leased the landmark prop­
erty for a 50-year period with a 25-year renewal option, then subleased it back 
to the City reserving the 100,000 square feet of floor area. The operative clause 
of the lease provides : 
Section 4.oI.  ( a) Tenant is hereby given the right, prior to or during the 
Demised Term, to combine the zoning lot of the Demised Premises with the 
zoning lot of the Adjoining Premises, so as to obtain a combined Floor 
Area Ratio . . . for the zoning lots of the Demised Premises and the Ad­
joining Premises ; however, as a result of such combination of zoning lots, 
Tenant shall not obtain more than one hundred thousand (100,000) square 
feet of floor area from the zoning lot of the Demised P remises. 
Lease between the City of New York and 41 Madison Company § 4.or (a) , Apr. 
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when a developer can be found who happens to own a lot located 
across a street or an intersection from a landmark or when a 
landmark owner who owns a series o f  lots that connect with the 
landmark lot desires to build on one or more of those lots. Under 
the plan, moreover, the market value of the rights is controlled 
wholly by the vagaries of construction activity within the imme­
diate vicinity of the landmark . Thus, while the transfer of, for ex­
ample, two hundred thousand square feet of floor space may com­
mand a premium if the landmark adjoins the site of a projected 
skyscraper, that space may be worthless if no construction is 
contemplated on the sites adjacent to the landmark. Nor does the 
plan offer a secure basis for p redicting that the income received 
from the transfer of development rights in any given instance 
will equal or exceed rather than fall short of the economic bur­
dens of landmark ownership. As pointed out earlier,45 these 
burdens are attributable to a variety o f  factors in addition to 
the unused development potential o f  the landmark site. Physical 
and functional obsolescence, assemblage value, and impairment 
of mortgageability and feasibility o f  renovation are only some of 
these additional factors. In a limited number of instances, more­
over, the landmark may already utilize virtually all of the floor 
area authorized for its site.46 Finally, the New York plan fails 
to provide supplementary funding for those cases in which de­
velopment rights sales do not promise full compensation. 
The second weakness of the New York plan lies in its laby­
rinthine procedures governing the issuance of transfer permits. 
The maze of discretionary approvals based upon vague aesthetic, 
planning, and urban design criteria are hardly calculated to at­
tract the voluntary participation o f  developers and landmark 
owners. These permits, moreover, are issued after formal desig­
nation has occurred. Yet the battle to safeguard threatened build­
ings of landmark quality is often lost at the designation stage 
itself. Owners of proposed landmarks typically oppose designa­
tion in response to their quite reasonable fears concerning its 
economic impact. Local governing bodies, too, have proven re­
luctant to designate buildings of unquestioned landmark status, 
as the Exchange debacle itself illustrates.47 This reluctance may 
stem either from the potent political influence of downtown real­
tor and developer groups, who generally oppose meaningful pres-
10, 1970. See Sher, 'Air Rights' Lease, Zoning, 164 N.Y.L.J. Oct. 9 ,  1 9 70, at 1 ;  
N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1970, at 34, col. i .  Sher notes that the method is "used 
commonly by private developers." Sher, supra, at 2 .  
45 See pp. 579-80 supra. 
46 An example is the Monadnock Building, Chicago's last and tallest sky­
scraper of masonry construction, which was designed by John Root. 
47 See note 3 supra. 
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ervation programs, 48 or from a concern for the eventual fiscal 
c onsequences that designation would entail for the city.49 If 
approval of an equitable incentive package, including an appro­
priate transfer authorization, were included in the designation 
process, it seems likely that the resistance of landmark owners 
and local governing bodies would lessen. 
A third difficulty with the plan is its reliance upon the volun­
tary participation of landmark owners. They may balk, because 
they question the legality o f  the plan or the marketability of the 
development rights, because they are developers who wish to pro­
ceed with redevelopment o f  the landmark site, or for any number 
o f  other reasons. Without their participation, of course, the pros­
pects for preservation revert to their former unhappy state. 
Fourth, it can be questioned whether the New York initiative 
adequately insures that the landmarks of participating landown­
ers will in fact be preserved. Relying essentially upon the trans­
fer of  some or all of  a landmark's floor area for this purpose is 
u nnecessarily risky. Under the New York plan a landmark own­
er apparently retains the right to demolish his landmark and 
replace it with a building o f  equivalent bulk if he decides that 
redevelopment would be more profitable.50 In addition, a subse­
quent increase in the FAR of the district in which the landmark 
is located would rekindle speculative interest in the property ; 
by recreating the excess floor area that had previously been 
transferred, it would give the owner an incentive to replace his 
landmark with a larger structure. The New York plan also lacks 
a mechanism that precisely defines the obligations assumed by 
the present and future owners o f  the landmark in consequence 
48 See note 3 5  supra. 
49 See pp. 583-84 & notes 3 7-39 supra. 
50 Mr. Frank Gilbert, Secretary of the New York Landmarks Preservation 
Commission, suggests that development rights transfers would discourage but not 
prohibit the destruction of the landmark : 
[W) hen completed, [a development rights transfer) reduces much of the 
economic pressure to tear down the landmark since it  could be replaced 
only by another building with the same amount of floor space. 
Gilbert, supra note 8, at 14 (emphasis added) .  
The absence of an express requirement that a landmark owner convey an 
intereit in the property obligating himself and future owners not to demolish or 
alter the landmark also points in this direction. Either § 74-791, which calls for 
a "program for . . .  continuing maintenance," or § 74-793 , which requires filing 
at the county registry of " [n) otice of the restrictions upon further development" 
of the landmark and transferee lots might be construed to include the conveyance 
of a preservation restriction. NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION art. VII, 
ch. 4, § §  74-791 , -793 (1971 ) .  But both are extremely vague. Significantly, no 
such restriction was contemplated in the Amster Yard transaction, discussed in 
note 16 supra. 
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of the transfer authorization and that affords the city an effec­
tive remedy for the breach of these obligations. 
Finally, the adjacency limitation of the New York plan need­
lessly produces a number of unfortunate urban design conse­
quences. First, mammoth concentrations of bulk within the 
compass of a block or less 51 might lead to an excessive demand 
for municipal services and to traffic congestion in the vicinity of 
the landmark. Second, a landmark building might be suffocated 
in adjacent superdensity, the visual enjoyment of a landmark 
being blotted out by the tall buildings around it. New York has 
responded to these risks by encasing development rights transfers 
in the straightjacket of administrative controls discussed above. 
But these controls have served only to deaden the enthusiasm of 
landmark owners and developers whose participation in the plan 
is absolutely essential to its success. 
B. The Chicago Plan 
r .  A n  Overview. - The discussion o f  the plight of the Old 
Stock Exchange Building touched upon four characteristics that 
are fairly common among urban landmarks throughout the United 
States. First, most utilize only a fraction of the floor area author­
ized for their sites under modern zoning. Second, most landmarks 
are currently able to operate at a profit ; 52 their imperilment 
stems from the greater value o f  their land as the site of large 
office or commercial structures.53 Third, endangered landmarks 
tend to be grouped in one or more reasonably compact areas o f  
the city, usually i n  high land value commercial and service dis­
tricts. Finally, municipal facilities and supportive services are 
also most heavily concentrated in these districts. This network 
of public facilities and services enables these districts to absorb 
51 The magnitude of density is enormous in the case of certain New York 
landmarks. For example, the excess development rights of the United States 
Customs House are 789,800 square feet, an amount equal to the floor area of the 
60-story Woolworth Building. See Burks, supra note 8, at 9, col. 5 .  
5 2  See notes 19  & 22 supra. 
53 The impact of rising land values on existing downtown development has 
been described as follows : 
In our . big cities of a half million or more population, [the] demolition of 
older structures was made economically feasible by parabolic increases in 
land val�f:S· As � matter of fact, there are very few parcels of land in our largest
. 
cities which have not had as many as three different structures on them in the last hundred years . . . . Our megalopolitan cities have grown so fast, however, that we have seen 25-year periods . . .  where the land value has increased so rapidly that it has become economic to demolish even a f.airly. new building in order to use the land more intensively - to exploit to its highest and best use the new land value created in a short span of time. 
Nelson, Appraisal of Air Rights, 23 APPRAISAL J. 495 (1955) [hereinafter cited as 
Air Rights] (emphasis added) .  
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large numbers of people with greater efficiency than other areas 
of the city. 
The Chicago Plan attempts to avoid the drawbacks of the 
New York plan through recognition of these factors. Briefly, 
the Plan would operate as follows. The city council, upon recom­
mendation of the landmark and planning commissions, would 
establish one or more "development rights transfer districts," 54 
which would roughly coincide with the areas where downtown 
landmarks are concentrated. Upon designation of his landmark 
or at any time thereafter, the landmark owner would be entitled 
to transfer its development rights to other lots within the transfer 
district in which the landmark is located and to receive a real 
estate tax reduction reflecting the reduced value of his property. 
Transfers may be made to one or more transferee lots provided 
that the constructive lot area of any transferee lot is not increased 
by more than fifteen per cent.55 Transfers would be subject to 
additional planning controls set forth in the municipality's pres­
ervation ordinance. In return for this transfer authorization, the 
owner would be required to convey to the city a "preservation 
restriction," which would bind him and future owners of the 
landmark to maintain it  in accordance with reasonable standards 
and to refrain from demolishing o r  altering it without the city's 
permission. 
Should a landmark owner reject the transfer option, the city 
would step in and condemn a preservation restriction and the 
landmark's development rights, though, in exceptional cases, the 
city might choose to condemn the landmark property in fee. Ac­
quisition costs and other expenses o f  the program would be funded 
through a municipal "development rights bank." The bank would 
be credited with development rights that have been condemned 
from recalcitrant owners, rights donated by owners of  other land­
marks, and rights transferred from publicly owned landmarks. 
The city would sell these pooled development rights as necessary 
54 A development rights transfer district should not be confused with the 
traditional historic district referred to at p .  581 supra. Unlike the historic dis­
trict, it serves as a marketing area for development rights and contains only 
a small number of buildings of significant architectural or historic character in 
relation to the total number of buildings within its boundaries . In addition, the 
municipal landmark commission reviews only those applications for alteration or 
demolition that relate to designated individual landmarks within a transfer dis­
trict. In contrast, the commission engages i n  building permit review with respect 
to all buildings within historic districts. 
5 5  The figure of r so/o was concurred in by municipal planners and architects 
in Chicago who viewed it as low enough to p rotect against the risk of urban design 
abuse, but not so low as to deprive the plan of economic appeal for landmark 
owners. Other cities may wish to increase or decrease this figure on the basis of 
their peculiar urban design needs and preferences. 
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to meet program costs, subject to the same planning controls that 
apply to private owners. 
As outlined above, the Chicago Plan redistributes preservation 
costs equitably and realistically. Transfer authorizations - o r  
cash awards, i f  the city is forced to condemn the property - and 
tax relief compensate the landmark owner for his losses. Elimi­
nating the property's development potential by acquisition of the 
preservation restriction decreases the value of the site and ex­
tinguishes speculative interest in it. Landmarks will remain in 
private hands as vital commercial or office buildings instead o f  
undergoing mummification as museums. Hence, the city avoids 
outlays for fee acquisition, restoration, and maintenance, and 
may continue to tax the landmark property, although at a lesser 
rate. Moreover, these tax losses will be more than offset by in­
creased tax yields from the larger buildings authorized by the 
transferred development rights. And, in return for their financial 
contribution to the landmarks program, downtown developers 
receive full value in the form o f  governmental licenses to build 
larger structures than local zoning otherwise permits. 
In addition to safeguarding threatened landmarks, the Chi­
cago Plan promises to expedite downtown development gener­
ally by easing the difficulties of land assembly. Developers who 
have assembled all but a small fraction of a unified tract would 
be permitted to fill out the remainder by purchasing development 
rights from landmark owners or from the municipal development 
rights bank. This privilege would be subject, of course, to appro­
priate safeguards - again set out in advance in the preservation 
ordinance - concerning light, air and other design features of  
these projects. At the present time, developers often obtain bulk 
variances on spurious legal grounds 56 or spend months or years 
trying to acquire the additional strip needed to make their project 
economically feasible.57 
2. The Elements of the Chicago Plan: A Closer Examination. 
- a. The Incentive Package. - Unlike the New York program, 
the Chicago Plan is designed to compensate the landmark owner 
for the actual losses that he suffers. Prior to proposing designa­
tion of a landmark, the landmark commission will obtain an 
appraisal of the property that details the economic consequences 
of designation. The appraisal will also enumerate any structural 
defects, restoration or rehabilitation problems, or unique main­
tenance problems that further intensify the burdens of private 
ownership. The commission will then devise a package to com-
56 See authorities cited in note 2or infra. 
57 See Air Rights 497. The author is personally familiar with a number of 
land assemblies in Chicago that required from four to six years to complete. 
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pensate the owner that will include an authorization to transfer 
up to one hundred per cent of the landmark's lot area and an 
appropriate real estate tax reduction. Transfers under the Chi­
cago Plan will be measured in terms of lot area rather than floor 
area,68 since the introduction of zoning bonuses and other com­
plications into modern zoning codes makes lot area, rather than 
floor area, the factor that developers use to calculate the size 
and volume of projected developments.59 An additional subsidy, 
funded out of the municipal development rights bank, may be 
included to cover losses not met by the package and to deal with 
special difficulties affecting the building. 
The real estate tax reduction, an integral element of the Chi­
cago Plan, should prove especially attractive to landmark own­
ers.60 The impact of a real estate tax reduction can be dramatic 
because real estate taxes are the largest single item in the cost 
of operating downtown buildings .61 A study recently undertaken 
in Chicago, for example, concluded that a twenty-five per cent 
reduction in the assessed valuation of downtown office buildings 
would result in a tax saving equal to twice the average repairs 
and maintenance budget for such properties.62 These savings 
alone will compensate the owners of many landmarks for their 
losses.63 Since tax reductions under the Plan will be geared to 
the drop in appraised value that landmark properties suffer as a 
58 The Chicago Plan uses the same technique - combination of the lot area 
of the landmark and project sites - that was used in the Appellate Division 
Courthouse transaction. See note 44 supra. It does not entail the transfer of 
"air rights." The latter are a property interest in a three-dimensional location 
in space. Development rights, on the other hand, are simply a governmental license 
to build a defined amount of floor area as measured by the amount of lot area 
that has been constructively "transferred" to the project site. 
59 Another difference between the New York and Chicago Plans concerns the 
permanence of a development rights transfer. Transfers of development rights 
are "irrevocable" in New York. See NEw YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION 
art. VII, ch. 4, § 74-792 (4) ( 1971) . Under the transfer proposal, on the other 
hand, landmark owners may be authorized by the municipal landmark com­
mission and city council to purchase additional development rights to use on their 
sites if their buildings are destroyed by natural or other casualty occurrences be­
yond their control. 
60 Real estate tax relief is not included in the New York plan as such. The 
New York Landmarks Act, N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 96(a) (McKinney Supp. 
1970) and the Preservation of Landmarks and Historical Districts Ordinance, 
NEW YoRK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 8-A, § 207-8.oa( z )  (1971) both au­
thorize tax abatement. But the latter has not yet been extended to New York 
landmark owners, either generally or in conjunction with development rights 
transfers. 
61 OFFICES 123. 
62 Chicago Report 22 . 
63 Id. at 1 $ .  
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result of permanent designation, these reductions can be expected 
to equal or exceed the twenty-five per cent figure in a large num­
ber of instances. 
b. Preservation Restriction. - Under the Chicago Plan, mu­
nicipalities will obtain a preservation restriction in landmark 
properties except in the rare case when fairness requires that 
the city acquire a property in fee .64 The advantages o f  less-than­
fee acquisition are substantial . By this means, government limits 
its interference with private ownership, yet secures the preserva­
tion of landmarks. The latter continue in their original use or 
in an adaptive reuse that serves the space needs of the downtown 
area. The condemnation award will be reduced ; maintenance 
and restoration costs are borne by the owner aided, in appropri­
ate cases , by subsidies from the development rights bank; and 
the landmark property remains on the tax rolls. 
Other advantages of preservation restrictions may also be 
cited. The preservation restriction enables landmark owners to 
qualify for federal 65 and state 66 income tax and local 67 real 
estate tax benefits that they might not otherwise enjoy. It also 
allows for more precise regulation of the obligations o f  landmark 
ownership. While these obligations can also be defined to some 
extent by general ordinance, as in New York, the interests of 
the city and the landmark owner are better served by an instru­
ment that has been carefully tailored to take account of the 
peculiarities of individual properties . Finally, the preservation 
restriction offers accurate notice to mortgagees, purchasers, and 
other interested parties of the encumbrances attaching to the 
landmark property.68 
64 This will be the case when the economic burdens of landmark ownership, 
as a result of an individual landmark's structural unsoundness, functional obsoles­
cence or other cause, rise to such a level that its profitable operation is impossible. 
65 A preservation restriction may help to ensure that donors of development 
rights to the development rights bank receive a federal charitable deduction. See 
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170 ; Rev. Ruling 64-205, 1964-2 CuM. BULL. 62. See 
also R. BRENNEMAN, PRIVATE APPROACHES TO THE PRESERVATION OF OPEN LAND 
ch. 5 (1967) [hereinafter cited as BRENNEMAN] . Presently under consideration is 
a change in the federal income tax laws that would liberalize· guidelines for 
qualifying donations of preservation restrictions as charitable deductions. Address 
by Kenneth Gemmill, First Conference on Legal Techniques in Preservations, in 
Washington, D.C., May 2, 1970 (sponsored by National Trust for Historic Pres­
ervation) . 
66 Twenty-six states have a personal income tax base that is derivative of the 
federal income tax base. Hence, charitable deductions taken under the latter may 
be included under the former as well. Address by Kenneth Gemmill, supra note 65 .  
67 The exis.tence of  a preservation restriction would have probative value in 
showing a lower appraisal value of property. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, 
§ n-48.2-6 ( 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-27-14 (Supp. 1971 ) . 
68 The adequacy of existing recording indexes for this purpose, however, has 
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c. The Development Rights Transfer District.  - The adja­
cency restriction is a principal culprit in the failure of the New 
York initiative to win the support of the real estate industry and 
of landmark owners. It severely impairs the marketability of 
development rights. It scatters density throughout the city on 
the capricious principle of how closely proposed developments 
border on landmarks. And it necessitates burdensome design re­
view procedures to insure that landmark buildings are not over­
whelmed by adjacent behemoths.69 
The Chicago Plan dispenses with the adjacency requirement 
by permitting transfers to any property within the development 
rights transfer district in which the landmark is located. This 
approach promises to avoid the economic and planning difficulties 
that have crippled the New York plan. The market for develop­
ment rights under the Chicago Plan should prove more lucrative 
than the market under the New York plan on two counts. First, 
transfer districts are likely to encompass the high land value 
been questioned on two grounds. First, the absence of an index specifically de­
voted to public restrictions complicates title searches on landmark properties. 
Second, in the absence of special legislation, recorded preservation restrictions are 
subject to termination pursuant to state obsolete restrictions and marketable title 
acts. See note 167  infra. 
69 The adoption of the adjacency restriction in New York, despite these 
drawbacks, was motivated by a desire to fit development rights transfers into 
the legal rationale that purportedly justifies the award of zoning bonuses. See 
Marcus. The latter, it will be recalled, are granted in return for an amenity. 
Located on the same lot as the oversize building, the amenity, it is claimed, 
"digests" the building's extra floor area by providing additional light and air 
or by facilitating the movement of traffic generated by the building. This rationale 
thus answers the concern of city planners that the increased intensity of use re­
sulting from the granting of zoning bonuses will be absorbed by the amenity for 
which ·the bonus was given. See generally DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, SAN 
FRANCISCO DOWNTOWN ZONING STUDY, FINAL REPORT (1966) ; Ruth, Economic 
Aspects of the San Franlisco Zoning Ordinance Bonus System, in NEW ZONING 
159; Svirsky, supra note 6. Landmarks, too, are viewed as amenities in the form 
of so many "light and air parks." See Marcus. But they obviously cannot be 
located on the same lot as the building to which their excess floor area has been 
transferred. If they are to digest this additional density, it is thought, they must 
be as close to the building as possible. Hence, the origin of the adjacency restriction . 
While the adjacency restriction thus fits within the digestion rationale, the 
advantages of this rationale may be more apparent than real. It has not received 
express judicial approval. Moreover, the rationale seems more metaphorical than 
legal in content since it is difficult to conceive of an operational test that indi­
cates how much light and air is needed to "digest," let us say, 50,000 additional 
square feet of office space. In addition, the digestion rationale is demonstrably in­
adequate as an explanation for some types of incentive zoning. Amenities such 
as theaters, see note IO supra, or retail stores, see note 1 2  supra, will actually 
increase traffic at the project site. 
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areas of the city since, as already noted,70 threatened urban land­
marks tend to be grouped in such areas. It can be assumed that 
municipalities will capitalize on this advantage in drawing the 
boundaries of their development rights transfer districts. Second, 
the marketability of development rights will not be dependent 
upon the vagaries of construction activity on sites immediately 
adjacent to landmarks. They will be governed instead by the 
general vigor of the construction and real estate markets in the 
particular municipality's central commercial and service areas. 
The area-wide approach, as conceived under the Chicago Plan, 
also promises to minimize the undeniable risk of urban design 
abuse that attends any incentive zoning program. It will do so 
by means of controls that govern the establishment of develop­
ment rights transfer districts and that regulate transfers that 
subsequently take place within these districts. Prior to recom­
mending the establishment of  any district, the municipal land­
mark and planning commissions will prepare a study of the area 
in question that inventories the number and type of  prospective 
landmarks there ; that estimates the amount of floor area - over 
and above that already authorized for the area under present 
zoning - that might be transferred upon designation of the land­
marks ; and that details the capacity of the area's public services 
and facilities to absorb this additional density. In addition, the 
planning commission will review the compatibility of the proposed 
district with the municipality's comprehensive plan and its de­
tailed plan, if any, for the area. This study and the accompanying 
recommendation of the two agencies will provide the basis for 
the local governing body's decision to establish the district and 
to determine its boundaries. 
Once established, transfer districts will be protected from 
undue concentrations of density in at least three respects. First, 
an upper bound on the amount of lot area that may be transferred 
within a district is fixed by the number of designated landmarks 
there. That number is not likely to be excessive in absolute 
terms: Chicago's architecturally-rich Loop area, for example, wil l  
probably have no more than thirty designated landmarks. Nor 
will all of the landmarks within a district incur substantial de­
preciation upon designation. Measured against the size of the 
district and its capacity to absorb density, therefore, the total 
amount of transferable density is likely to be marginal.71 
70 See p. 582 supra. 
71 It is estimated that the transfer of some 300,000 feet of lot area, coupled 
with appropriate tax reductions, will be sufficient to fund a preservation program 
for the landmark buildings in Chicago's Greater Loop area. See Chicago Report 
20. Because the scope of the program is so limited, concern that a city will be 
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Second, most if not all of the floor area that will be added to 
new projects under the Chicago Plan will already have been 
authorized by existing zoning. The main thrust of the Plan, 
therefore, is upon the redistribution of previously authorized 
floor area rather than upon the creation of wholly new floor area 
as in the case of zoning bonuses. Hence, the Plan will occasion 
little or no net increase in presently authorized density of the 
district. 1 2  
Third, the proposal envisages that transfers will be restricted 
to selected use and bulk districts - essentially high density com­
mercial and apartment zones - within the development rights 
transfer district, and that no transferee site may be increased by 
more than fifteen per cent of its actual lot area. These limitations 
will further minimize the possibilities of urban design abuse. 
Preliminary indications are that the principal buyers of develop­
ment rights will be developers of smaller interior lots in commer­
cial zones that cannot practicably utilize zoning bonuses and of 
lots devoted to high-rise apartment developments.73 Such shifts 
in density are unlikely to distort the cityscape within the transfer 
district. With the advent of the skyscraper and the absence of 
stringent height limitations, the American cityscape has assumed 
a distinctly irregular form best exemplified by the Manhattan 
skyline. Sprinkling an additional four to six stories on lots in 
these centrally located districts will make little difference in such 
a setting.74 
engulfed in surplus density is misplaced. But proposals have been made that 
would escalate development rights transfers to a level that might produce this 
result. For example, Ira Duchan, New York City Commissioner of Real Estate, 
has suggested that excess floor area be transferable to nonadjacent sites from any 
building or facility owned by the city. See Burks, supra note 8. 
72 Under the New York plan, no net increase in density can occur because 
transfer of only the authorized but unused floor area is allowed from any land­
mark site. See p. 584 supra. A net increase is theoretically possible under the 
transfer proposal, however, because transfers of up ·to 100% of a landmark's 
lot area may be authorized in . appropriate cases. But data compiled in the Chi­
cago Report indicate that a net increase in the density of a transfer district is 
highly improbable. Relatively few landmarks are likely to incur such grave 
depreciation that only a full 100% transfer authorization over and above real 
estate tax relief will promise to compensate their owners fairly. See Chicago 
Report 1 2-15 .  In fact, tax relief alone will be sufficient to compensate landmark 
owners in many cases. Id. at 21-2 2 .  Nor should it be anticipated that all of 
the lot area pooled in the municipal development rights bank will be put on the 
market. On the contrary, only an amount necessary to provide supplementary 
funding for the municipal preservation program will be transferred. Id. at 20. 
73 See Chicago Report 16-19. 
74 As described in the text, development rights transfer districts would roughly 
coincide with geographic areas of the city in which urban landmarks are concen­
trated. In this way an urban design tradeoff is achieved: bulk within the district 
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d. The Role of the Municipality. - The municipality's role 
under the New York plan is both too little and too great. It is 
too little because the city must expend its own scarce revenues to 
safeguard threatened landmarks if the development rights carrot 
fails to entice landmark owners. And it is too great because the 
plan's labyrinth of discretionary approvals tends to discourage 
owners and developers from electing to participate in the pro­
gram at all. 
The Chicago Plan directly addresses both of these problems. 
As to the first, it enables the municipality to finance a vigorous 
preservation program without dipping into general revenues. Sales 
of development rights from the municipal development rights 
bank should provide the financial basis for effective public inter­
vention in whatever form individual cases may require. 
Development rights credited to the bank will derive from 
three sources. The principle source will be landmark owners who 
decline the transfer option and insist that the city pay them a 
is redistributed in exchange for the increased amenity resulting from the presence 
of low density structures there. Moreover, the bulk restrictions of the traditional 
bulk zones within the district are left unchanged. 
A second approach is conceivable under which transfer districts would coincide 
with areas that, though presently zoned to relatively low densities, are expected 
to undergo intensive development soon. Whether or not these areas contain land­
marks would be irrelevant. In rezoning them to the greater densities warranted 
by development expectations, densities permitted as of right would be deliberately 
skewed to levels falling somewhat short of the total amount of density that the 
market could absorb and that would be consistent with community health and 
safety. Developers within these areas would be permitted to purchase the re­
maining density increments from landmark owners, wherever located, or from the 
municipal development rights bank. 
A proposal for restoring the Georgetown Waterfront Historic District has been 
advanced along these lines. Premised on the expectation that the stringent height 
limitations presently in force in downtown Washington will be removed, it would 
enable owners of property within the Historic District to sell development rights 
to developers within the downtown Washington area, the receipts of these sales 
being used to upgrade the Historic District. See Von Eckardt, Getting Charm and 
Height, Wash. Post, Feb. 27 ,  1971, § C, at r ,  col. 5 .  
Unlike the Chicago Plan, this alternative method is open to  serious due process 
challenges. As will be shown later, the existence of the Chicago Plan casts no 
doubt on the underlying reasonableness of the bulk restrictions that remain in 
effect on nontransferee lots in the development rights transfer district, see pp. 
628-31 infra. Under the alternative, h owever, communities have conceded that 
the bulk levels permitted as of right in the transfer district are below those that 
would pose a threat to public health and safety. 
That the landowners may nevertheless obtain what the courts may deem a 
"reasonable return" on their property is not a sufficient answer t o  this objection. 
In addition to meeting the reasonabl e  return criterion, communities adopting 
these programs must also convince the courts that the development potential of 
private property may be regulated under the police power to raise funds or other­
wise provide compensation for public improvements that government is unable to 
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cash award for their losses.75 The bank will receive an increment 
of lot area in such cases equal to the value of the award but in 
no event greater than one hundred per cent of the landmark 
site. A second source will be other landmark owners who donate 
lot area. That such donations will be forthcoming is highly prob­
able in view of the tangible federal, state, and local tax benefits 
that donors will enjoy and, perhaps more importantly, in light of 
the central role that private philanthropy has traditionally played 
in the American preservation movement. The third will be the 
city itself, which is likely to own a fair number of the community's 
landmarks . The bank would be credited in the last two instances 
with increments of lot area proportional to the authorized but 
unbuilt floor area of the landmarks. 
The lion's share of the city's preservation costs will be cov­
ered by the sale of condemned development rights. But addi­
tional funds will be necessary for subsidies and for the relatively 
infrequent cases in which the transfer authorization-tax reduction 
package fails to provide adequate compensation. Donated de­
velopment rights and those provided by the city should provide 
an ample cushion in these cases. 
The Plan also seeks to simplify the administrative procedures 
governing development rights transfer authorizations . The prob­
lem here is to strike a correct balance between preventing urban 
design abuse through proper planning controls and facilitating 
the marketability of development rights by freeing them of oner­
ous restrictions. Under its program New York has little choice 
finance through general tax revenues. That question will be resolved affirmatively 
only if the courts are prepared frankly to extend the general welfare concept in 
the incentive zoning context to include fiscal as well as regulatory objectives. 
Whether the courts will take this step at the present time is unclear. 
75 Some commentators have intimated that an award of development rights 
alone may be sufficient to meet the constitutional requirement of just compensa­
tion that incentive zoning programs may trigger. Professor Mandelker, for ex­
ample, speaks of zoning bonuses as "a de facto quid pro quo for corresponding 
increases in development costs ." Mandelker, The Basic Philosophy of Zoning: 
Incentive or Restraint?,  in NEW ZONING 1 6 .  Norman Marcus has suggested that 
the availability of the transfer option might make it more difficult for landmark 
owners to establish that landmark restrictions deprive them of a reasonable return 
on their property. See Marcus. While this view may be acceptable in some juris­
dictions, see generally Haar & Hering, The Determination of Benefits in Land 
Acquisition, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 833 ( 1 963 ) ,  it is open to two objections in others. 
First, the jurisdiction may require that compensation for the interest taken be in 
cash . See, e.g., 3 P. NICHOLS , NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 8.2 (3d 
rev. ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as NICHOLS] ; Department of Pub. Works v. 
Caldwell, 301 Ill. 242 , 133 N .E. 642 ( 192 1 ) .  Those jurisdictions that do pennit 
special benefits to be set off against the interest taken might nevertheless regard 
development rights as having too uncertain a value to merit recognition as a form 
of special benefits. 
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but to err on the side of the former. Because every transfer 
shifts bulk to a site adjacent to a landmark, its aesthetic impact 
on the landmark must be examined on an individualized basis 
and in terms of highly subjective criteria. Moreover, the New 
York program provides no assurance beforehand that the physi­
cal services and facilities in the landmark's immediate area will 
be able to absorb the additional density resulting from the trans­
fer. This uncertainty, too, necessitates case-by-case review. 
The Chicago Plan largely avoids both problems by permitting 
transfers throughout development rights transfer districts. Few, 
if any, transfers under the Plan will be to sites adjacent to land­
marks because the number of  potential transferee sites is vastly 
expanded and because most cities already permit such transfers 
as of right under conventional zoning provisions. Except in the 
rare cases when such transfers occur, therefore, no need for de­
sign review exists. Further, development rights transfer districts 
are selected expressly upon the basis of the capacity of their 
public services and facilities to absorb any increased density that 
may be allocated within them under the Plan. Preselecting the · 
districts in this way also enables the city to dispense with case­
by-case review. The remaining controls envisaged under the 
Plan, such as the limitations concerning bulk and use districts 
to which transfers may be made and the permitted increases in 
the size of transferee lots, will be set forth in advance in the 
preservation ordinance and need not, therefore, be administered 
on a discretionary basis.  An additional advantage of the Chicago 
Plan is that it telescopes into a single proceeding the separate 
proceedings in New York. By this means, it will tend to reduce 
the resistance of owners and city councils to the formal designa­
tion of landmark buildings.76 
e.  Implementation of the Chicago Plan. - The Chicago Plan 
employs zoning techniques to advance preservation objectives ; 
thus it could be implemented either as a zoning or as a preserva­
tion measure. This choice will determine whether municipal au­
thority to adopt the Plan should originate in state zoning or state 
preservation enabling legislation and whether the zoning or the 
preservation ordinance should be the primary tool for its imple­
mentation at the municipal level. It may also shape the relative 
influence of the local planning and landmark commissions in 
administering the Plan. 
The American Law Institute's Model Land D evelopment 
Code 77 offers an ideal solution. Intended to serve as a compre­
hensive state enabling act to empower local communities to regu-
76 See pp. 587-88 supra. 
77 ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT ConE (Tent. Draft No. 2 ,  1 970) . 
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late land use and development, the Code treats zoning 78 and 
preservation 79 as two categories of this regulatory power. It 
thereby recognizes the close ties of technique and objective that 
zoning and preservation share,80 but does not ignore their sep­
arate identities. It envisages adoption at  the local level of a 
single Land Development Ordinance 81 to be administered by a 
single Land Development Agency.82 Under this arrangement, the 
Plan could serve as one component of the Ordinance, which is 
intended to address a variety of  land use concerns on a coordi­
nated basis . "Ultimate responsibility" 83 for administering the 
Ordinance - and thus the Plan - would rest with the Agency, an 
entity that most resembles the municipal planning commission. 
But landmark commissions would likely play an influential role 
as well in view of the Code draftsmen's suggestion that the 
Agency "delegate the administration of historic and other spe­
cial preservation regulations to specialized bodies expert in archi­
tecture and planning." 84 
The Code, unfortunately, is still adrafting, and resort must 
be had to a less satisfactory approach. Two alternatives are sug­
gested by the existing legislative framework that governs zoning 
and preservation matters. First, the Plan might be treated essen­
tially as a preservation undertaking : authority to adopt it would 
appear in the state preservation enabling act ; its mechanics would 
78 Id. Art. 2 .  
79 Id. § §  2-208 to -209. 
80 Municipal preservation efforts have been upheld as a manifestation of local 
zoning powers. City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 415, 
389 P.2 d  13, 17 ( 1 964) . They have been deemed "auxiliary to the general zoning 
power" in states having independent preservation enabling acts. Rebman v. City 
of Springfield, 1 1 1  Ill. App. 2d 430, 440, 2 50 N.E.2d 2 8 2 ,  287  ( 1969) . Many munic­
ipalities incorporate some or all of their preservation measures in their zoning ordi­
nances. See, e.g., NEW YORK, N.Y., ZoNING RESOLUTION art. 1 ,  ch. 1 ,  § n-121 ; 
art. 2 ,  ch. 1, § 2 1-00; art. 2 ,  ch. 3 ,  § 23-6 9 ;  art. 7, ch. 4, §§ 74-71 ,  74-79 (1971) ; 
CHARLESTON, S.C., CODE ch. 5 1 ,  art. III ( 1 966 ) .  Some state legislatures have 
expressly authorized municipalities to pursue historic preservation objectives under 
the zoning power. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 89.040 ( 1 9 71 ) ; NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 19-903 ( 1 970) . And numerous preservation enabling acts contain provisions 
expressly keyed into local zoning procedures. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
3 1 : 89-b ( 1970) ("All [historic] districts and [preservation] regulations shall be 
established in relation to the comprehensive plan and the comprehensive zoning 
ordinance of the city, or town") ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-24.1-7 (1971) 
(denials of building permits by the historic district commission appealable to 
zoning board of appeals) .  
81 ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 2-101 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1970) .  
82 Id. § 2-30I.  
83 Id. § 2-209, Note at 52. 
84 Id. § 2-209, Note at 52.  
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be detailed in the local preservation ordinance ; and its adminis­
tration would be vested primarily in the municipal landmark 
commission. The second alternative, on the other hand, would 
emphasize the Plan's hybrid character by according an increased 
role to the state zoning enabling act and to the local zoning 
ordinance and planning commission. 
The first of these routes was generally followed in Illinois.85 
That state's preservation enabling act was amended in 1971  to 
empower municip alities to implement all features o f  the Plan, 
including establishment of a development rights bank, acquisition 
of preservation restrictions and transfer of development rights.86 
As a precautionary measure, the "purposes" section of the state 
zoning enabling act was also revised to reflect that preservation 
of historic buildings is a proper objective of zoning.87 Local 
communities will implement the Plan through their preservation 
ordinances,88 but must revise the definition of "zoning lot" in 
their zoning ordinances to include the constructive lot area which 
owners are authorized to transfer under the Plan as well as actual 
lot area.89 The respective responsibilities of the landmark and 
planning commissions assume the form outlined earlier in this 
article.90 
The second approach has been chosen in New York. Pro­
visions implementing the New York program appear in the city's 
zoning ordinance,91 which assigns the dominant administrative 
role to the planning commission. 92 Since no amendatory legisla­
tion was sought at the state level, the city apparently concluded 
that its state zoning enabling act already empowered it to adopt 
these provisions. 
Although either approach is workable, the Illinois r oute seems 
preferable because it permits coordinated treatment in a single 
statutory enactment of the property, condemnation, and land use 
features of the Plan. In addition, it recognizes that zoning and 
85 See Ill. Pub. A. No. 77-1372 (Ill. Leg. Serv., Aug. 3 1 ,  1971 ) ,  in part to be 
codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § u-48.2-1A, in part amending ILL. REV. 
STAT. ch. 24, § u-48.2-2 & -6 (1969) .  
so Id. 
87 See Ill. Pub. A. No. 77-1373 (Ill. Leg. Serv., Aug. 3 1 ,  1971 ) ,  amending ILL. 
Rtv. STAT. ch. 24, § u-13-1 ( 1969) . Other state zoning enabling acts containing 
a similar provision are listed in note 80 supra. 
88 See Chicago Report app. III. 
89 Id. 
90 See pp. 591-92, 595 supra. 
91 See NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION, art. VII, ch. 4, § 74-79 et seq. 
( 1971 ) .  
92 See p. 585 supra. 
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the regulation of individual landmarks are actually separable 
manifestations of the police power.93 
JIJ. LEGALITY OF THE TRANSFER PROPOSAL 
Despite the economic feasibility and sound urban design fea­
tures of the Chicago Plan, the prospect of a legal challenge may 
deter its acceptance by landmark owners, the real estate industry, 
and local government. A court test of the plan is likely to center 
upon three o f  its principal features : the condemnation of preser­
vation restrictions, insofar as it  makes possible the sale of de­
velopment rights ; the use of preservation restrictions to encumber 
landmark properties ; and the authorization of greater floor area 
for development rights purchasers than for other property owners 
within the transfer district. Opponents of the proposal will con­
tend that it violates the "public use" limitation on governmental 
93 The misconception that zoning and the regulation of  individual landmarks 
are indistinguishable manifestations of the police power probably results from the 
fac·t that early preservation ordinances focused almost exclusively on the regulation 
of historic districts. Historic districting may properly be viewed as a special case 
of zoning because of its area-wide focus. But a "zoning" measure that singles out 
an individual landmark property for severe bulk, use, and area restrictions not 
applicable to its neighbors generally would risk invalidation on spot zoning and 
equal protection grounds. See also note 36 supra. Further, while zoning estab­
lishes area-wide restrictions that may be varied only in cases of individual hard­
ship, most preservation ordinances treat all formally designated landmarks as 
potential candidates for variances. Formal designation does not and is not intended 
to impose permanent landmark status on these properties. Rather, it continues un­
der most ordinances only so long as the landmark owner consents or, under others, 
until the owner establishes that designation entails undue economic burdens. See p. 
581 supra. It is for this reason that courts typically reject due process attacks on 
designation alone, but caution that designation and its attendant restrictions must 
be lifted upon a proper showing of economic deprivation. See, e.g., Trustees of 
Sailor's Snug Harbor v. Platt, 53 Misc. 2d 933 ,  280 N.Y.S.2d 75 (Sup. Ct. 
196 7 ) , rev'd on other grounds, 29 App. Div. 2d 376,  288 N.Y.S .2d 314 (1968) ; 
Manhattan Club v. Landmark Preservation Comm'n, 51 Misc. 2d 556, 273 
N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1966) ; cf. State ex rel. Marbro Corp. v. Ramsey, 28 
Ill. App. 2d 25 2 , 171  N.E.2d 246 ( 1960) ; In re Opinion of the Justices, 33 Mass. 
7 73 ,  128 N.E. 2d 557 (1 955 ) .  
If individual landmarks could be regulated through the zoning power, the 
objectives of the Chicago Plan could be achieved largely by downzoning all land­
mark sites to the bulk of their present improvements. Measures akin to this 
technique were upheld in Rebman v .  City of Springfield, I I I  Ill. App. 2d 430, 250 
N.E.2d 282 ( 1 969) (downzoning of commercial area around President Lincoln's 
home to low density residential uses upheld) , and underlie the "limited height 
district" provision of the New York Zoning Resolution. See NEW YORK, N.Y., 
ZONING RESOLUTION art. 1 ,  ch. I ,  § Il-1 2 1 ; art. 1 ,  ch. 2 ,  § 12-10 (1971)  (strict 
height limits may be imposed throughout designated historic districts) .  Both 
examples, however, entail regulation of entire areas of a city, not of individual 
landmarks. 
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power under the state and federal constitutions to condemn prop­
erty because the acquisition of preservation restrictions is linked 
to a scheme of selling development rights on the private market. 
They will attack the use of preservation restrictions on various 
grounds : the most troublesome is that such restrictions are not 
recognized property interests and that their acquisition is not 
authorized by existing preservation enabling acts and ordinances. 
And they are likely to assert that nonuniform floor area alloca­
tions violate state zoning enabling legislation and deny equal pro­
tection and due process to property owners who do not purchase 
development rights. 
A. The Public Use Requirement 
If the Chicago Plan envisaged only the condemnation of an in­
terest in landmark properties, no serious constitutional objection 
based on the public use requirement could be asserted against the 
Plan's employment of the condemnation power. The courts have 
repeatedly held that landmark preservation is a public use, in 
aid of which that power may be exercised.94 Moreover, the ob­
jection that acquisition of less-than-fee interests fails to promote 
a public use because such interests are not susceptible to physical 
use or occupation by the public has also been discredited.95 It is 
now recognized that visual enjoyment alone constitutes a sufficient 
use by the public to warrant condemnation. 
But the Chicago Plan also authorizes municipalities to resell 
in the private market the development rights associated with the 
preservation restriction that it condemns in private properties. 
Because condemnation of the preservation restriction and re­
sale of the associated development rights are connected steps in 
an integral scheme, opponents of the Chicago Plan may assert 
that it violates the public use requirement on two further grounds. 
First, it may be argued that, despite its claimed public objectives , 
the Plan in fact serves the interests of a distinct private group, 
namely development rights purchasers. Second, it may be argued 
that governmental action taken to recoup the costs of condemna­
tion of the preservation restriction violates the public use re­
quirement. 
94 See, e.g., Roe v. Kansas ex rel. Smith, 278 U.S. 191 (1 929) ; United States 
v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668 (1896) ; Barnidge v. United States, 101 
F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1939) ; Unfred States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 99 F. Supp. 
714 (E.D. Pa. 1951 ) ,  aff'd, 215  F.2d 140 (3d Cir. 1954) . 
95 See, e.g., Kansas City v. Lie bi, 298 Mo. 569, 252  S.W. 404 ( 1923) ; In re 
New York, 5 7  App. Div. 166, 1 73 ,  68 N.Y.S. 196, 200-01 , aff'd per wriam, 167  
N.Y. 624, 60 N.E. uo8 ( 1901 ) ; Kamrowski v .  State, 3 1  Wis. 2d  256,  142  N.W.2d 
793 (1966) . 
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r. Private Benefit. - Without the active participation of pri­
vate developers, the transfer proposal cannot succeed. To secure 
their support, it accords them preferential treatment by relaxing 
zoning restrictions to permit them to build more profitably than 
nonparticipants in the program. Hence, there is the possibility 
of an attack on grounds that the proposal serves private rather 
than public interests and that the use of eminent domain to this 
end is invalid. Similar charges are seen in cases dealing with 
governmental efforts to enlist private enterprise in programs de­
signed to renew urban areas,96 attract industry to depressed loca­
tions,97 revitalize port and terminal facilities,98 and secure the 
construction of parking facilities 99 and government buildings.100 
This charge is a difficult one for the courts to handle. The 
dangers of improper private gain are often quite real. And, re­
grettably, favoritism or venality on the part of the public officials 
who administer these programs is not uncommon. But this cen­
tury has witnessed a vast expansion of governmental responsibil­
ities as a result of population growth and the population movement 
to the cities. The courts have responded by broadening earlier no­
tions of the ambit of the public use concept and by according legis­
latures wide discretion in selecting means for meeting these re­
sponsibilities.101 Moreover, the charge that a program, legisla­
tively declared to be a public use, actually serves private interests 
requires courts to go behind the statute to peer into legislative 
motive and into the program's history and implementation. Few 
courts welcome these tasks. 
Judicial discomfort in the face of these difficulties pervades 
the decisions that examine allegations of undue private gain. 
Four conclusions emerge from an examination of such cases. 
First, private gain, whether accruing to identified individuals 102 
96 See, e.g., Belovsky v. Redevelopment Auth., 3 5 7  Pa. 329 ,  340, 54 A.2d 277, 
282 ( 1 94 7 ) .  
97 See, e.g., City o f  Frostburg v.  Jenkins, 2 1 5  Md. 9 ,  16-1 7, 136 A.2d 852 ,. 
856 ( 1 957) ; Basesore v. Hampden Indus. Dev. Auth., 433 Pa. 40, 50, 248 A.2d. 
2 1 2 ,  2 1 7  ( 1 968) . 
98 See, e.g., People ex rel. Adamowski v. Chicago R.R. Terminal Auth., 14 Ill. 
2d 230, 236, 1 5 1  N.E.2d 3 1 1 ,  3 15 ( 1958) . 
99 See, e.g., Poole v. City of Kankakee, 406 Ill. 5 2 1 ,  530, 94 N.E.2d 416, 421 
(1950) ; Court St. Parking Co. v. Boston, 336 Mass. 224 ,  230, 143 N.E.2d 683 , 
687 ( 1957) . 
100 See, e.g., People ex rel. Adamowski v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, II Ill. 2d 125, 
144, 142 N.E.2d 67, 7 7-78 ( 195 7) . 
101 See, e.g., People ex rel. Adamowski v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, I I  Ill. 2d 125, 
142 N.E.2d 67 ( 1957) ; Lerch v. Maryland Port Auth., 240 Md. 438, 2 14 A.2d 
76 1  ( 1 965) ; Court St. Parking Co. v. Boston, 336 Mass. 2 24, 143 N.E.2d 683 
( 1 95 7 ) . 
102 See, e.g., Hanston v. Danville & W .  Ry., 208 U.S. 598 ( 1 908) ; Town of 
Steilacoom v. Thompson, 69 Wash. 2d 705, 4 1 9  P.2d 989 (1966) . 
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or to the private sector generally,103 does not itself invalidate a 
program. Second private gain must be justified by the benefits 
accruing to the �ublic under the program.104 Judicial tests of 
justification are crude and, in large measure, conclusory : some 
courts reason that private gain must be "incidental" or "subor­
dinate" to the public gain; 105 others emphasize that the public 
gain must justify the risk sustained by the government in the 
program.106 Third, each case turns very much on its own facts 
and the specific leg islative framework within which the program 
operates. Fourth, and perhaps most important, allegations of 
undue private gain are rejected in the overwhelming majority of 
cases ; they prevail only under circumstances of clearly dispro­
portionate private g ain.107 
These conclusions augur well for the transfer proposal. That 
developers receive substantial benefits does not of itself taint the 
proposal. Authoritative recog nition of landmark preservation as 
a public use is persuasive evidence that the public advantages 
of the proposal offset those benefits.108 Moreover, the transfer 
proposal contains safeguards to insure that the benefits to private 
developers do not become the tail that wags the dog. Condemned 
development rights are credited to the municipal bank in an 
amount strictly calculated to reimburse the city for its condemna­
tion costs. Besides, since developers will be expected to bid for 
the development rights on the open market, the value of these 
rights will be returned to the city in the form of cash payments 
from these developers. 
2. Recoupment. - The second aspect of the public use limi­
tation proscribes condemnation solely designed to recoup the cost 
of public programs or to add to the public fisc generally. It is 
on this basis, for example, that courts have frowned upon excess 
condemnation,109 the acquisition of more land than is needed for 
103 See cases cited notes 96-100 supra. 
104 See Note, State Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Eminent Domain, 
77 HARV. L. REV. 717 ,  724-25 (1964) ; Note, The 'Public Purpose' of Municipal 
Financing for Industrial Development, 70 YALE L.J. 789, 796 ( 1 96 1 ) .  
105 See, e.g., Papadinis v. City of Somerville, 331  Mass. 627,  6 3 2 ,  1 2 1  N.E.2d 
714, 717 ( 1954) ; Denihan Enterprises, Inc.  v. O'Dwyer, 302 N.Y. 451,  458, 99 
N.E.2d 235, 238 (195 1 ) .  
106 See Price v. Philadelphia Parking Auth., 422 Pa. 3 1 7, 336, 2 2 1  A.2d 138,  
149 (1966 ) . 
107 See, e.g., Shizas v. Detroit, 333 Mich. 44, 52 N.W.2d 589 ( 1952) ; Denihan 
Enterprises, Inc. v. O'Dwyer, 302 N.Y. 451 ,  99 N.E.2d 235 ( 19 51 ) ; P rice v .  
Philadelphia Parking Auth., 422  Pa. 3 1 7 , 22 1  A.2d 138 ( 1966 ) ; Note, State Con­
stitutional Limitations on Eminent Domain, supra note 104, at 7 2 4-25. 
108 See cases cited note 94 supra. 
109 See Cincinnati v. Vester, 33 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1929) , af!'d, 281 U.S. 439 
(1930) ; cf. Salisbury Land & Improvement Co. v. Commonwealth, 215 Mass. 3 7 1 ,  
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a public project with the intent to resell the remainder at a profit 
after completion of the project. Needless to say, the recoupment 
objection has particular relevance to the transfer proposal : only 
by selling development rights acquired from nonparticipating 
landmark owners will a city be able to compensate them for their 
losses. 
The courts have been no more comfortable with the recoup­
ment objection than with the claim of undue private benefit. 
Again, the competing considerations are not easily reconciled. 
The key objection to recoupment concerns the propriety of utiliz­
ing eminent domain, one of the harshest of  governmental powers, 
to fund public programs, rather than resorting to general tax 
revenues for this purpose. Municipal poverty, it is argued, does 
not justify such drastic interference with private ownership.110 
For some, the objection is ideological : 11 1 government has no place 
in the private real estate market and thus should not be able to 
sell or lease portions o f  condemned property to private parties. 
For others, it rests on the practical consideration that government 
enjoys unfair advantages over the private real estate industry in 
any competition between the two. 112 Still others express misgiv­
ings about the wisdom of government becoming involved in high­
risk ventures. 113 The final objection is the familiar one that oppor­
tunities for favoritism and corruption are heightened by public 
programs that return large sums of money to municipalities.114 
On the other hand, adherents o f  recoupment counter that expand­
ing governmental responsibilities in this century have created 
demands for public funding that simply cannot be met out of 
102  N.E. 6 19 (1913) .  See generally R. CUSHMAN, ExcEss CONDEMNATION (1917) 
[hereinafter cited as CUSHMAN ] ; Hodgman, Air Rights and Public Finance: P11blic 
Use in a New Guise, 42 S .  CAL. L .  REV. 625  ( 1969) . 
1 1 0 See, e.g., CUSHMAN 14-16.  
1 1 1  See Housing Auth. v. Johnson, 209 Ga. 560, 563 , 74 S.E.2d 891 , 894 (1953) 
(to permit eminent domain for urban renewal would "cut the very foundation 
from under the sacred right to own property") . 
1 1 2  See, e.g., Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Ranken, 34 Del. Ch. 439, 485, 105 
A.2d 614,  640 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (dissenting opinion) ;  Adams v. Housing Auth., 60 
So. 2d 663 , 668-69 (Fla. 195 2 ) ; Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port Auth., 12 
N.Y. 2d 3 79, 398 , 190 N.E.2d 402 , 4n, 240 N.Y$.2d 1 ,  13-14 (1963) (Van Voorhis, 
J ., dissenting) . 
1 13 See, e.g., Adams v. Housing Auth., 60 So. 2 d 663, 670 (Fla. 1952) (char­
acterizing urban renewal as a "gigantic real estate promotion") .  After detailing 
the enormous losses of public monies suffered by European countries that utilized 
excess condemnation schemes in the 19th century, Cushman states that " [t]he first 
conclusion is that the risk of loss is too serious to warrant [the] adoption [of 
excess condemnation] as a method of municipal finance." CUSHMAN 212. 
1 14 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia, 242 Pa. 47, 57-
58, 88 A. 904, 908 ( 1913 ) .  
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general tax revenues.115 Without recoupment of at least some of  
these funds they note, many programs of  vital importance to ' 116 
public welfare would be gravely endangered. 
Caught between these opposing contentions, the courts have 
found uneasy refuge in the formula that recoupment objections 
will be overridden if the recoupment is but an ''incidental" ele­
ment of a program that furthers an independent public use.117 
This formula is first cousin to the judicial formula used to evaluate 
claims of undue private gain, both formulas approving the chal­
lenged feature if it rides piggyback on a recognized public use.
118 
While both formulas are imprecise, they allow the judiciary to 
control the more egregious of legislative excesses. And both for­
mulas result in the approval of  the great majority of the programs 
to which they are applied. 
Three groups of cases serve to illustrate judicial reluctance 
to invalidate the use of eminent domain because of a recoupment 
objection. The first concerns the propriety of selling a byproduct 
of property condemned for a public project, 119 best illustrated in 
litigation dealing with the sale of electricity from navigation im­
provement projects undertaken by federal and state agencies. 
Recoupment challenges to such sales have been decisively re­
jected.120 In rejecting such challenges, the courts have pointed 
to three grounds for validating such sales : they enable public 
agencies to recapture the costs of public improvements ; 121 they 
m See, e.g., Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Ranken, 34 Del. Ch. 439, 46r,  I05 
A.2d 6r4, 627 (Sup. Ct. r954) ; cf. Haar & Hering, supra note 75 ; Hodgman, 
supra note ro9. 
1 1 6 See cases cited note IOI supra. 
1 1 7  See, e.g., Kaukauna Water Power Co. v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal, 142 
U.S. 254, 2 73 ( 1891) ; Wilmington Parking Auth. v .  Ranken, 3 4  Del. Ch.  43 9 ,  
450, 105 A.2d 614, 620-2r (Sup. Ct. 1954) ; Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v .  
Port Au th., 1 2  N.Y.2d 3 79, 390, 190 N.E.2d 402, 406, 240 N.Y.S.2d l ,  7 ( 1 963 ) .  
1 18 An examination of the opinions reveals that a court's willingness to label 
the recoupment feature "incidental" to the underlying purpose frequently turns 
upon i.ts willingness to concede that the latter is indeed a public purpose. Compare 
In re Opinion of the Justices, 332 Mass. 769, 1 2 6  N.E.2d 795 ( 1 9 5 5 ) ,  and Hogue 
v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 34r  P.2d l7I  (r959) , with Lerch v. Mary­
land Port Auth., 240 Md. 438, 214 A.2d 761 ( r 965 ) ,  and Atwood v. Willacy 
County Navigation Dist., 2 71 S.W.2d 13 7 (Tex. 1954) , appeal dismissed, 350 U.S.  
804 ( 1955 ) .  Especially illustrative of  the mixing of the two issues is the dissenting 
opinion of Judge Van Voorhis in Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port Auth., 
12 N.Y.2d 3 79, 393, 190 N.E.2d 402, 407, 240 N.Y.S.2 d  I, 9 ( 1963 ) .  
119 See, e.g., Ashwander v. TVA, 2 9 7  U.S. 288 ( r936) ; Arizona v. California, 
283 U.S. 423 (193 1 ) ; United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co.,  2 2 9  
U.S. 53 (r913) ; Kaukauna Water Power Co. v .  Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co.,  
142 U.S. 2 54 ( 1891 ) .  
120 See cases cited note I I  9.  
1 2 1  See, e.g., United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co . ,  2 2 9  U.S.  53,  
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advance community welfare by making possible the fulfillment 
of vital public needs that would otherwise go unmet for lack of 
funds ; 122 and they encourage the productive use of valuable re­
sources .123 
In the byproduct cases no portion of the condemned land is 
devoted to private uses. The recoupment question is more difficult 
in the second group of cases, which examine projects in which 
space in buildings erected on condemned land is leased to private 
firms to defray project costs. Such arrangements are common in 
highway, port, railroad terminal, governmental center, and park­
ing projects.124 Again, however, the courts generally find that 
recoupment of project costs through leasing arrangements with 
private firms is "incidental" to an overall public use.125 
Certain factors stand out in the leasing cases which are rele­
vant to the Chicago Plan. I f  the project cannot be carried on 
without recoupment or if  it responds to a public need that private 
enterprise cannot or will not meet, the courts are likely to be sym­
pathetic.126 That the project involves government in competition 
with private enterprise is irrelevant provided that an independent 
public use is served by the endeavor.127 Nor are the courts im-
72-73 ( 1913 ) ; Kaukauna Water Power Co. v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 142 
U .S .  254, 2 73 ( 1891 ) .  
122 See, e.g., Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S .  288, 336-3 7  ( 1936) ; Kaukauna Water 
Power Co. v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 142 U.S .  2 54, 2 73 (1891 ) .  
123 Cf. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 ( 1 936 ) ; Arizona v. California, 283 
U.S. 423 ( 1 93 1 ) .  
124 See, e.g., People ex rel. Adamowski v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, II III. 2d 125,  
142 N.E.2d 67  ( 1 957)  (public buildings) ; Lerch v .  Maryland Port Auth. ,  240 
Md. 438, 2 1 4  A.2d 761 ( 1 965)  (port facilities) ; Court St. Parking Co. v. Boston, 
336 Mass. 2 24, 143 N.E.2d 683 ( 1957)  ( parking facilities) ; Bush Terminal Co. v. 
New York, 282 N.Y. 306, 26 N.E.2d 269 ( 1940) ( railroad terminal facilities) . 
125 See, e.g., Wilmington Parking Au th. v. Ranken, 34 Del. Ch. 439, 105 A.2d 
6 1 4  (Sup. Ct. 1954) (lease of space in municipal parking facility) ;  People ex rel. 
Adamowski v. Chicago R.R.  Terminal Auth., 14 Ill. 2d 230, 151  N.E.2d 3 r r  
( 1 958)  (lease of space in  railroad ·terminal) ;  In r e  Opinion of  the Justices, 330 
Mass. 713 ,  n3 N.E.2d 452 ( 1953 ) (lease of space for restaurants and filling sta­
tions along highways) .  But see Shizas v. Detroit, 333  Mich. 44, 5 2  N.W.2d 589 
( 1 9 5 2 )  (lease of space in parking facility invalid) ; Price v. Philadelphia Parking 
Auth., 422  Pa.  3 1 7 , 2 2 1  A.2d  138 ( 1 966) (same) .  
126 See cases cited note 1 2 5  supra ; cf. In re Slum Clearance, 331 Mich. 714, 
50 N.W.2d 340 ( 1 95 1 ) .  
127 In his dissenting opinion in Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port Auth., 
12 N.Y.2d 3 79 ,  393 ,  190 N.E.2d 402, 407, 240 N.Y.S.2d l, 9 ( 1 963 ) ,  Judge Van 
Voorhis warned "that centralization of international trade firms in one govern­
mentally sponsored center threatened to wreak havoc with New York City's 
priva.te real estate market. However, private enterprise has no constitutionally 
protec.ted immunity from competition by governmental agencies, see, e.g., Green 
v .  Frazier, 253 U.S. 233,  243 ( 1 920) ; Poole v. City of Kankakee, 406 Ill. 521, 
529 ,  94 N.E.2d 416, 420 ( 1 950) . 
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pressed with claims that a program is not financially feasible ; 
they defer to legislative judgment on questions of program con­
tent and merit unless the program is patently u nreasonable.128 
Similarly, they reject the oft-repeated charge that use of the emi­
nent domain power in part for recoupment goals opens the way to 
"outside land speculation" and other abuses.129 Should these 
abuses eventuate, they note, an appropriate remedy will lie in 
the courts. Otherwise, government, too, is entitled to exercise 
sound business judgment in the formulation and conduct of public 
programs.130 
In the final group of cases, which deal with the recoupment 
objection in the context of urban renewal, the government's in­
volvement with the condemned property is the most attenuated. 
In urban renewal programs, after the city has acquired and 
cleared the land, it resells it to private developers. Once again, 
however, the courts have overridden the recoupment objection . 
Public use of the land, these courts say, is achieved once the city 
has acquired and cleared i t.131 Its resale to private developers 
128 See, e.g., Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Ranken, 34 Del. Ch. 439, 448-49, 
105 A.2 d 614, 620 (Sup. Ct. 1954) ; Lerch v. Maryland Port Auth., 240 Md. 
438, 449, 2 14 A.2d 761 , 767 (1965 ) .  
129 See, e.g., People ex rel. Adamowski v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, II Ill. 2d 125 , 
144, 142 N.E.2d 67 ( 195 7 ) ; People ex rel. Gutknecht v. Chicago, 3 III. 2d 539, 
545, 121 N.E.2d 791, 795 (1954) ; Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port Auth., 1 2  
N.Y.2d 3 79, 391, 190 N.E.2d 402, 406, 240 N.Y.S.2d 1 ,  7 (1963 ) .  
130 In United States ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 327  U.S. 546 (1946) ,  the Supreme 
Court upheld the condemnation of a strip of land not directly included within a 
TVA project area against the claim that the TVA's sole motive in acquiring the 
land was to reduce project costs. The Court reasoned: 
The cost of public projects is a relevant element . . . .  [T]he Government, 
just as anyone else, is not required to proceed oblivious to elements of costs . 
. . . And when serious problems are created by its public projects, the Gov­
ernment is not barred from making a common sense adjustment in the 
interests of all the public. 
Id. at 554 (citations omitted) .  Numerous cases, both before and since, have ex­
pressly acknowledged that government may exercise its power of eminent domain 
in accordance with sound business judgment provided, of course, that a valid public 
use underlies the governmental program. See, e.g., Old Dominion Land Co. v. 
United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925) ; Simmonds v. United States, 199 F.2d 305, 
306 (9th Cir. 1952) ; Boston v. Talbot, 206 Mass. 82, 90, 91 N.E. 1014, 1016 
(1910) ; cf. Brown v.  United States , 263 U.S. 78 ( 1 923 ) .  
131 See, e.g., People ex rel. Tuohy v. Chicago, 394 Ill. 477, 485 ,  68 N.E.2d 761 ,  
766 (1946) ; Papadinis v .  City of Somerville, 331  Mass. 627 ,  63 2 ,  1 2 1  N.E.2d 714, 
717 (1954) ; Foeller v. Housing Auth., 198 Ore. 205, 241,  256 P .2d 752 , 769 ( 1 953 ) .  
It should be noted, however, tha·t a number o f  jurisdictions find that the public 
use requirement is satisfied whenever a government program serves a public pur­
pose. See, e.g., Gohld Realty Co. v. Hartford, 141 -Conn. 135, 104 A.2d 365 ( 1 954) . 
These jurisdictions, therefore, would not even need to focus on the city's temporary 
occupancy of condemned land in considering the validity of an urban renewal 
·program. 
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thereafter is but an "incidental" aspect of the urban renewal 
process, akin to, if not identical with, the general municipal prac­
tice o f  disposing of city property no longer needed for public 
purposes. Retention of the land, they note, would be poor munic­
ipal stewardship because resale enables the community to recap­
ture much o f  its initial outlay and to return the land to produc­
tive use and to the tax rolls.132 
Taken together, the three g roups of cases indicate that the 
success of a recoupment challenge to the condemnation of preser­
vation restrictions under the Chicago Plan is extremely unlikely, 
even though condemnation is connected with a scheme of selling 
development rights to fund the costs of condemnation. Like by­
product sales, the transfer o f  development rights enables public 
agencies to recapture the costs o f  public improvements (the costs 
of  preserving landmarks ) ; to fulfill community needs that would 
go otherwise unmet ( landmark preservation being impractical 
without the sale of development rights) ; and to ensure the pro­
ductive use of valuable resources (the unused but authorized 
development rights of public and private landmarks otherwise 
being lost upon permanent designation) .  
The leasing cases reinforce this conclusion. They emphasize 
the legal irrelevancy of the fact that the sale of development 
rights may involve the city in competition with private enterprise 
if developers elect to purchase these rights rather than to acquire 
privately owned parcels in completing land assemblages. The 
leasing cases confirm that competition between government and 
the private sector is not legally objectionable so long as govern­
ment enters the private marketplace in furtherance of a program 
that serves an independent public use. Questions concerning the 
financial feasibility o f  the Chicago Plan will also not be litigable 
under these precedents. Finally, charges that the Chicago Plan 
might involve a municipality in land speculation and other abuses 
will receive scant attention since the leasing cases establish that 
this question will be considered only if and at the time that such 
abuses eventuate. 
The urban renewal cases off er further proof that, in and of it­
self, the recoupment feature o f  the Chicago Plan does not con­
stitute a basis for the Plan's invalidation. Under the Plan the city 
retains a continuing interest in the landmark property in the form 
of a preservation restriction. Yet, in the urban renewal context, 
many courts have rejected the recoupment objection under a 
rationale that does not obligate the city to keep any interest what-
132 See, e.g., In re Slum Clearance, 3 3 1  Mich. 714, 722 ,  50 N.W.2d 340, 344 
(1951 ) .  
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soever in the urban renewal tracts that it resells to private de­
velopers.133 
B. The Preservation Restriction 
The purchase or condemnation of preservation restrictions 
raises a host of legal problems that lack clear resolution in most 
states. Their range is suggested in Pontiac Improvement Co. v. 
Board of Commissioners,134 a 1933 Ohio case that puzzled over 
a statute authorizing local governments to condemn the "fee or 
any lesser interest" in real estate. In Pontiac, the Cleveland Park 
Commission attempted to condemn the right to impose controls 
respecting drainage, construction, planting, and the like over the 
plaintiff's land, which adjoined a city park. The court invalidated 
the taking in a rather confused opinion that appears to reflect 
at least three concerns. One is the injustice to the plaintiff of tak­
ing a less-than-fee interest in his land, thereby leaving him with 
all of the responsibilities but few of the privileges of ownership.135 
The second is the novelty of the interest in question and, by im­
plication, the vagueness of the statutory mandate on which the 
taking was premised. The court might have approved the taking 
had the interest fit within one of the traditional less-than-fee in­
terests recognized at common law or had the authority for its 
acquisition been clearly spelled out in the statute. Third, its 
doubts on both counts led it to conclude that, whatever the 
nature of the interest, the statute failed to define the rights and 
obligations of the parties with sufficient clarity to be enforce­
able.136 
133 To be sure, all local governments sell urban renewal tracts subject to re­
strictive covenants that ensure that the urban redevelopment plan for the area 
will be accomplished. Cf. Project Planning ch. 2 ,  at 1 (RHA No. 72op, 1969 ) ,  
in U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, URBAN RENEWAL HANDBOOK 
(1971) . Some jurisdictions, in finding that urban renewal serves a public use, 
point to this factor. See, e.g., Foeller v. Housing Au th., 198 Ore. 205, 256  P .2d 
752 ( 1953 ) .  A significant number of other jurisdictions, however, find that a 
public use is achieved merely by the city's ownership of the urban renewal prop­
erty during the period of clearance. See, e.g., People ex rel. Tuohy v. Chicago, 
394 Ill. 477, 485, 68 N.E.2d 761 , 766 ( 1 946) .  
134 104 Ohio St. 447, 1 3 5  N.E. 635 ( 1 9 2 2 ) .  See also Albright v .  Sussex County 
Lake & Park Comm'n, 71 NJ.L. 303, 5 7  A. 398 (Ct. Err. & App. 1 904) (taking 
under statute authorizing acquisition of "rights of fishing common to all in fresh­
water lakes" held invalid) . 
13� . •  Pontiac Improvement Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 104 Ohio St. 447,  456-5 7 ,  
135 N.E. 6 3 5 ,  637-38 (192 2 ) .  
136 ld. at 463-64, 135 N.E. at 640. A further ground for the court's invalidation 
was its conclusion that the condemnation did not promote a public use. Id. at 
459, 135 N .E. at 638. This conclusion seems clearly inapplicable to preservation 
restrictions, see p. 603 supra. 
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Pontiac dealt not with a preservation restriction but with what 
would now be termed a "conservation" or "scenic easement." 137 
The relation between the two types of interests, however, is suffi­
ciently close that the concerns expressed in Pontiac provide a 
useful framework for an examination of the legal problems affect­
ing the preservation restriction. 
r.  Acquisition in Fee. - Pontiac's concern that a less-than­
fee taking by itself is unfair to the landowner seems misplaced. 
It runs counter to the well-settled view that public authorities 
neither may nor should take a greater interest in or amount of 
land than the public use necessitates.138 This view finds strong 
support in the policies that favor limiting outlays o f  public funds 
and minimizing governmental interference with private owner­
ship.139 Pontiac's concern seems especially inapplicable to urban 
landmarks. Most of  these buildings return amounts well in 
excess of their taxes and operating expenses. Thus, even after 
condemnation of a preservation restriction (with its concomi­
tant tax reduction) , the landmark should be able to operate at a 
profit. 
However, in some cases landmarks will be unable to return 
a profit after condemnation o f  a preservation restriction. In 
these cases, leaving a landmark owner with what one commenta­
tor calls the "rump rights" 140 of ownership may raise questions 
o f  equity to the landmark owner. Structural unsoundness, ad­
vanced deterioration ,  or changes in the surrounding neighborhood 
may mean that acquisition of a preservation restriction will, in 
effect, saddle the owner with a white elephant. In such instances, 
the landmark commission should recommend that the city ac­
quire the property in fee. 
2. A cquisition of a Less-Than-Fee Interest. - The powers of 
purchase and eminent domain granted in many preservation acts 
137 The literature concerning this interest has been extensive in recent years. 
See, e.g., B RENNEMAN ; S. SIEGEL, THE LAW OF OPEN SPACE (1 960) ; A. STRONG, 
OPEN SPACE FOR URBAN AMERICA ( 1 965) ; w. WHYTE, SECURING OPEN SPACE FOR 
URBAN AMERICA : CONSERVATION EASEMENTS (Urban Land Institute, Technical 
Bull. No. 3 6 ,  1959) ; N. WILLIAMS, LAND ACQUISITION FOR OUTDOOR RECREATION 
- ANALYSIS OF SELECTED LEGAL PROBLEMS (Outdoor Recreation Resources Re­
view Comm'n Study Report No. 16,  1962) [hereinafter cited as WILLIAMS] ; 
Note, Techniques for Preserving Open Spaces, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1622 (1962) ; 
Note, Preservation of Open Spaces Through Scenic Easements and Greenbelt Zon­
ing, 1 2 STAN. L. REV. 638 ( 1960) . 
138 See, e.g., Miller v. Commissioners of Lincoln Park, 2 78 Ill. 400, 406, 116 
N.E. 1 78, 181 ( 1 9 1 7 ) ; 3 NICHOLS § 9 .2 (3d rev. ed. 1 965) ; WILLIAMS 46. 
139 3 NICHOLS § 9.2 (3d rev. ed. 1965 ) .  
140 WILLIAMS 48. I n  Professor Williams' view, a "policy of taking conservation 
easements under the characteristic general statute is undesirable, potentially un­
fair, and legally dangerous." Id. 
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are as imprecisely defined as those in the Pontiac statute.141 
Do these acts authorize the acquisition of a preservation restric­
tion in landmark properties ? As suggested above, that question 
can be answered affirmatively only if a court is prepared to con­
clude either that preservation restrictions fall within one of the 
less-than-fee interests recognized at common law or that the stat­
utory language itself creates a novel property interest. 
(a) Traditional Interests. - The first alternative assumes an 
extremely sympathetic court. Preservation restrictions do not 
easily assume the garb of easements, real covenants, or equitable 
servitudes, the relevant common law categories.142 They are most 
often compared with negative easements,143 which obligate a land­
owner to refrain from performing acts on his property that would 
otherwise be permitted as an incident of fee ownership. Landmark 
owners, for example, may not build in the airspace over their 
buildings nor may they demolish or significantly alter them. But 
negative easements have normally been restricted to the four 
types approved in the early English cases : easements for light, 
for air, for support of a building laterally or subjacently, and for 
the flow of an artificial stream.144 Although resembling easements 
for light and air in its restriction against building above the land­
mark, a preservation restriction goes beyond the former in its 
controls over alteration and demolition.145 In addition, some 
courts may not enforce negative easements that are not "appur­
tenant" to the benefited parcel, the dominant estate.146 The ap­
purtenancy requirement is satisfied only if the easement benefits 
the owner of that estate in the physical use and enjoyment of the 
141 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 266 .06 ( 1962 ) ("real property o r  rights or ease­
ments therein") ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-9004 ( 1 )  (Supp. 1971) ("any real estate") .  
142 The discussion of this extremely complex topic is necessarily abbreviated in 
this paper. More detailed analyses may be found in BRENNEMAN 20-64 ; WILLIAMS 
37-55 ; Commonwealth of Massachusetts: Metropolitan Area Planning Council, 
Massachusetts Open Space Law: Government's Influence Over Land Use Decisions, 
4 Open Space and Recreation Program for Metropolitan Boston, April 1969, at 
18-23, 140-56 .  143 See, e.g., WHYTE, supra note 13 7 ,  a t  44-46 ; Comment, Legal Met hods of 
Historic Preservation, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 6u, 62 I ( 1970) . The easement cate­
gory appears to be the one most readily invoked by courts when confronted with 
a novel less-than-fee interest. See, e.g., Buck v. City of Winona, 2 7 1  Minn. 145, 
151,  135 N.W.2d r90, 194 ( 1 965) ; Piper v. Ekern, 180 Wis. 586 , 596, 194 N.W. 
159, 163 ( 1923 ) .  
144 See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § §  8.5, 9.12,  9.24 (A.J. C asner ed. 1952) 
[hereinafter cited as AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY] ; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY 
§§ 45o(e) , 452 (1944) . But see BRENNEMAN 23-2 4 ;  WILLIAMS 49-50 & nn. 72-76. 
145 See pp. 618-19 infra. 14s s ee 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.2.  But see WILLIAMS 5 1 .  
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land and was created expressly for the purpose of conferring 
that benefit.147 If these requirements are not met, the easement 
will be deemed to be held "in gross." Municipal ownership of 
parcels that will qualify as "appurtenant" is likely to be infre­
quent unless the courts will so categorize city-owned properties 
within the general vicinity of a landmark or the publicly owned 
streets and alleys that border on it.148 Even assuming that a 
jurisdiction approves negative easements in gross, moreover, the 
assignability of these interests has been questioned.149 
It is even less likely that preservation restrictions will be 
enforceable as real covenants. Courts generally insist that these 
interests, too, must be appurtenant to a benefited dominant es­
tate.150 An additional requirement, privity of estate between the 
original promisor and promisee, dictates that the benefited and 
burdened parcels must initially have been in common ownership 
and that the burden must have been imposed on the latter parcel 
at the time the ownership was divided. Otherwise, the burden of 
the real covenant will not bind subsequent takers of the parcel.151 
Because few, if any, cases under the transfer proposal are likely 
to duplicate these rather specialized facts, it is doubtful whether 
a municipality will be able to enforce a preservation restriction 
against a successor o f  the owner who executed it. In addition, 
some jurisdictions balk at the enforcement of affirmative duties 
in real covenants ,152 a qualification that could prove troublesome 
i f  a municipality wished to include maintenance obligations in 
the preservation restriction.153 
Characterizing a preservation restriction as an equitable 
servitude offers a more promising route than either of  the pre-
147 See 2 AMERICAN LAw oF PROPERTY §§ 8.6, 9 .8.  
1 48 See WILLIAMS 50. 
149 For accounts of the confused state of the law on this problem, see, e.g., 
BRENNEMAN 3 0 ;  C. CLARK,  REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH RUN 
WITH LAND 6 7-79 (2d ed. 1 947) ; Comment, Assignability of Easements in Gross, 
3 2  YALE L.J. 813 (1923 ) .  
1 5 0  See, e.g., Young v. Cramer, 38 Cal. App. 2d 64, loo P .2d 523 (1940) ; Lon­
don County C ouncil v. Allen, [1914] 3 K.B. 642 .  But see Neponsit Property Own­
ers' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 15  N.E.2d 793 (1938) . The 
British National Trust, which typically acquires real covenants in historic prop­
erties, has secured legislation that eliminates the common law requirement that 
it own nearby land as a condition to its right to enforce the benefit of the cov­
enants. See National Trust Act, l Edw. 8 & l Geo. 6,  c. lvii, § 8 (1 93 7 ) .  
1 5 1  See, e.g., Hall v. Risley, 188 Ore. 69, 2 1 3  P . 2 d  818 ( 1 950) ; BRENNEMAN 
54. But see Nicholson v. 300 Broadway Realty Corp., 7 N.Y.2d 240, 164 N.E.2d 
83 2 ,  196 N.Y.S.2d 945 ( 1 959) ; CLARK, supra note 149, at u6-2 1 .  
152 See, e.g., Miller v. Clary, 2 1 0  N.Y. 127,  1 03 N.E. l I I4 ( 1 9 13 ) ; BRENNEMAN 
57 ; Lloyd, Enforcement of Affirmative Agreements Respecting the Use of Land,. 
14 VA. L. REV. 419 (1928) . 
153 See pp. 618-19 infra. 
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vious alternatives. Equitable servitudes are not res tricted t o  four 
specific types as are negative easements, but may incorporate any 
obligation that does not violate public policy.154 No privity of 
estate other than that provided by the agreement need exist be­
tween the landmark owner who executes it and the city in order 
for the agreement to be effective against successors of the for­
mer.155 Servitudes are enforceable by injunction 156 and may 
include affirmative as well as negative obligations .157 They must 
reflect the intent to bind subsequent takers ; 158 and the latter 
must have notice of the agreement,159 requirements easily satis­
fied by careful draftmanship and use o f  the deeds registry, re­
spectively. But in many jurisdictions servitudes held in gross 
are not enforceable against subsequent takers o f  the burdened 
parcel 160 and may not be assignable as well.161 So again, munic­
ipalities in these jurisdictions must be prepared to argue that 
municipally owned property, whether adjacent to or nearby the 
landmark property, will be directly benefited by en forcement of 
the servitude. 
The technicalities attending each of the common law interests 
confuse the status of the preservation restriction under the com­
mon law. Though the courts in some jurisdictions may be willing 
to enforce the preservation restriction under the rubric of one 
of the foregoing interests, a pre ferable solution would seem to 
lie in clarifying legislation. 
( b )  Statutory Authorization. - Whether statutory authoriza­
tion to acquire an imprecisely defined, less-than-fee interest re­
lieves a municipality of the burdensome restrictions of the 
common law rules is problematic. Pontiac suggests not. But an 
opposite view, which may well have supplanted Pontiac in most 
jurisdictions,162 was tersely stated by then Chief Judge Holmes in 
Newton v. Perry : 
154 BRENNEMAN 50-5 1 ,  55 .  
155 See, e.g., Trustees of Columbia College v.  Lynch, 70 N.Y. 440 (1877) ; 2 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.26 ; BRENNEMAN 56.  
1 5 6  BRENNEMAN 55. Real covenants, on the other hand, may only be enforced 
in an action at law for damages. Id. 
157 See BRENNEMAN 57 ; Lloyd, supra note 1 5 2 .  
158 See Mass. Open Space Law, supra note 142,  at 148-49. 
159 ld. at 148. 
lso s A ee 2 MERlCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.3 2 ; BRENNEMAN 58. But see Van 
Sant v. Rose, 260 Ill. 401, 103 N.E. 1 94 ( 1913) ; Pratte v. Balatsos, 99 N.H. 430, 
n3 A.2d 492 (1955 ) .  
161 See BRENNEMAN 59. 
162 See, e.g., State ex rel. Ervin v. Jacksonville Expressway Au th., 139  So. 2d 
135, 138 (Fla. 1962) ; Cornwell v. Central Ky. Natural Gas Co.,  249 S.W.2d 53 1 ,  
533 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952) .  
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[I] t is plain . that the purpose of the taking must fix the 
extent of the right. The right, whether it  be called easement or 
by any other name, i s  statutory, and must be construed to be 
large enough to accomplish all that it has taken to do.163 
The question is further confused by decisions that subsume 
less-than-fee interests under one of the traditional categories even 
though they clearly fail to meet the formal requirements of the 
latter.164 
State legislatures have grown uneasy with the dubious formal­
ism of the common law and the ambiguity in the case reports. 
To facilitate highway beautification and open-space programs, 
many have expressly authorized state and local agencies to ac­
quire "scenic easements," "development rights," and other novel 
less-than-fee interests.165 Although the statutes fail to detail pre­
cisely what is intended by these labels, Kamrowski v .  State,166 
which upheld a Wisconsin statute authorizing acquisition of 
"scenic easements" along the Great River Road, confirms the 
readiness of the judiciary to construe them most favorably to 
the public agency. Significantly, Kamrowski did not even men­
tion the possible difficulties posed by the differences between the 
statutory easement and its common law cousin, but focused in­
stead upon the compatibility of the statute with the public use 
requirement. 
163 163 Mass. 319, 3 2 1 ,  39 N.E. 103 2 ,  1032 (1B95 ) .  
164 See, e.g., cases cited note 143 supra ; Burger v . .St. Paul, 241 Minn. 285, 
64 N.W. 2d 73 ( 1954) . Burger is of special interest to this article because it 
construes a statute that parallels the transfer proposal in enabling municipalities 
to zone by acquiring the development potential of parcels within "designated 
residential districts" in order t o  prevent them from being utilized for other than 
low-density, residential uses. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 462 .12-.14 ( 1963 ) .  In 
Burger, 'the court variously labeled the interest that the statute empowered com­
munities to condemn an "easement,'' a "negative easement,'' a "reciprocal negative 
easement,'' a "restrictive covenant,'' and, for good measure, a "negative equitable 
easement." Burger v. St. Paul, supra at 293, 294, 297,  299, 64 N.W.2d at 78, 
79, Bo, Br .  It did no·t discuss whether the common law formalities applicable 
to easements and real covenants were superseded by the statute notwithstanding 
the obvious differences between the interest acquired and the common law interests. 
Other cases construing the statute include State ex rel. M adsen v. Houghton, 182 
Minn. 77, 233 N.W. 83 1 (1 930) ; Summers v. Midland Co., 167 Minn. 4531 209 
N.W. 3 23 (1926) ; State ex rel. Twin City Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. Houghton, 144 
Minn. 1,  176 N.W. 159 (1920) . Approving a similar zoning scheme, the Missouri 
Supreme Court labeled the interest acquired a "negative restriction." Kansas City 
v. Kindle, 446 S .W.2d 807, 813-14 (Mo. 1969 ) .  That court, too, ignored the com­
mon law problems associated with its characterization of  the interest. 
165 See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CooE § §  6950--54 (West 1966) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS 
ch. 92 , § 79 (1969) ; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 23 .30 (Supp. 1 9 71 ) .  
166 3 1  Wis. 2 d  256, 142 N.W.2d 793 ( 1 966) . 
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Of greater interest are statutes in three states 167 that accord 
express recognition to the preservation restrictions as an inde­
pendent, valid less-than-fee interest. Directly addressing the 
difficulties outlined in this s ection, these statutes provide that 
preservation restrictions shall not be unenforceable because of 
lack of privity of estate or of ownership of benefited land. They 
also stress the assignability of preservation restrictions, even if  
held "in gross." Less elaborate statutes have also been passed 168 
that modify the common law by recognizing "easements in gross," 
which are assignable and, if negative, not restricted to the four 
types known to the common law. By clarifying an intolerably 
opaque area of the law, both groups of statutes enable govern­
ment and the private sector to participate in preservation and 
conservation programs confident that some hoary doctrine will 
not frustrate their reasonable expectations. 
3. Indefiniteness. - The Pontiac court considered that the 
rights acquired by the park department were so i ndefinite as to 
be incapable either of valuatio n  or of enforcement. The valuation 
objection does not seem well taken. Less-than-fee interests are 
condemned as a matter of course by government and public util­
ities. In these cases, a basic "before and after" theory of valua­
tion is used that measures the value of the parcel with and without 
the encumbrance.169 And, although "not simple," s etting a price 
tag for preservation restrictions "by no means goes beyond tech­
niques which are widely recognized in the field o f  real estate 
valuation. " 170 
Nor is the court's skepticism concerning enforcement insuper­
able if the preservation restriction is properly drafted. In fact, 
167 See CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. P .A.  No. 1 73 ,  § 2 [Jan. 1 9 7 1 ]  Conn. Legis. 
Service No. 2 ('May 16, 1971 ) ; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § n-24.2-1A(2) ( 1 9 71 ) ; 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1 84, § 32 (Supp. 1970) . 
In addition to curing the ambiguities of the common law in relation to preserva­
tion restrictions, the Massachusetts statute also provides for the recordation of 
these interests on a public tract index and suspends the operation of Massachusetts' 
marketable title and obsolete-restrictions legislation for any interest entered upon 
the index. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, §§ 3, 33 (Supp. 1 9 70) . 
168 See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 2 1 , § 8 (1957) ;  VA. CODE ANN. § 2 r .1 2  
(Supp. 1971 ) .  
169 F . al t h . d · or appraIS ec mques use with respect to the acquisition of less-than-
fee interests generally, see, e.g., 4 NICHOLS § 1 2 .4 (3d rev. ed. 1 9 7 1 )  ; South v. 
Texas E. Transmission Co., 332 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App. 1 960) . A useful 
analysis of the valuation techniques used in the acquisition of scenic easements 
along highways is found in DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OF WISCONSIN A 
MARKET STUDY OF PROPERTIES COVERED BY ScENIC EASEMENTS ALONG THE GR�AT 
RIVER 
.
ROAD IN VERNON AND PIERCE CouNTIEs (Special Report No. 5, 196 7 ) . 
Valuation of preservation restrictions is discussed in Chicago Report u-15 
17° Chicago Report n .  
. 
· 
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with the increasing refinement of these instruments, indefiniteness 
no longer appears to be a serious problem. Typical preservation 
restrictions 171 detail the legal authority o n  which acquisition is 
premised, restrictions on use, maintenance obligations, duration, 
remedies, and miscellaneous matters. Public agencies and pres­
ervation societies carefully spell out the statutory basis for ac­
quisition to emphasize that they are empowered to acquire the 
interest and that enforcement of the latter is consistent with 
sound public policy. Use restrictions are as varied as the char­
acter and setting of particular landmarks. They may include 
prohibitions against alteration or demolition, signs, subdivision 
of the landmark tract, addition of buildings to the site and speci­
fied uses of the landmark. Administrative provisions detail the 
procedures for obtaining approval for permitted modifications 
and for making periodic inspections of the premises to insure 
that the restrictions are being honored. Maintenance obligations 
are variously stated. Landmark owners may agree simply to 
keep their properties in good repair or they may undertake to 
comply with property maintenance standards that are incorpo­
rated by reference into the preservation restriction. In some in­
stances, owners even commit themselves to restore the properties 
in accordance with detailed specifications and schedules. 
Duration of the restriction may be in perpetuity or be limited 
to a number of years. The instruments underscore the intent of 
the parties that the benefits and burdens of the restriction shall 
run to their successors in interest. The remedies clause identifies 
who may sue for breach of the restriction and what relief may 
be obtained. Miscellaneous provisions may include anything from 
rights of  first refusal to express disclaimers of rights of public 
access to the landmark. Surveys, line drawings, and photographs 
appear increasingly as appendices to preservation restrictions. 
They permit precise identification of prized interior or exterior 
features, such as paneling, fireplaces, and cornices. 
Although most preservation restrictions relate to residential 
properties a t  the present time, they can be drawn just as effec­
tively for d owntown office and commercial buildings . Remedies 
and legislative authority clauses will be similar in the two cases. 
Use restrictions should prove simpler for downtown buildings 
1 7 1  Instruments reviewed in compiling the outline in the text are those ac­
tually being used by the following organizations and institutions : Maryland His­
toric Trust ; Historic Annapolis, Inc. ; Historic Savannah Foundation ; Ipswich 
(Mass.) Historic Trust ; Cambridge (Mass.) Historic Trust ; and the United 
States Dept. of the Interior. Useful guidelines and examples for use in drafting 
conservation and, derivatively, preservation restrictions may be found in BRENNE­
MAN apps. II, IV ; WHYTE, supra note 137, at 44-46, apps. A-H passim ; Wn.UAMS 
53-55 ; Mass. Open Space Law, supra note 142, at app. 8 .  
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because tract subdivision and the addition of new buildings are 
not serious problems. Continuation of office or commercial uses 
within these buildings, moreover, will not impair their status as 
landmarks. Controls over alteration will deal mostly with changes 
in the exterior facades of these buildings, an infrequent occur­
rence and one that is relatively easy to regulate. 
The definition of proper m aintenance standards is no different 
for downtown landmarks than for other centrally located office 
and commercial buildings. It is a routine responsibility for attor­
neys who represent the holders of mortgages on the latter struc­
tures and the tenants who occupy space in them under long-term 
leases. The task will be somewhat complicated, however, if the 
landmark commission's appraisal of a building reveals that res­
toration of the building or one or more of its characteristic fea­
tures is in order. In those instances, the financial package that 
the commission proposes to the landmark owner may include 
sums for this work. If so, the nature of the restoration and any 
specific requirements regarding subsequent maintenance must be 
detailed in the restriction or in a related document, as the sense 
of the transaction dictates. 
The most troublesome drafting problem is posed by the fact 
that many downtown office and commercial buildings have a 
limited economic life. The day may come, sooner for some land­
marks than for others, when they can no longer meet debt service 
and operating costs as a result of increases in the latter and 
declining revenues. At that point, ownership for private profit 
obviously becomes impossible. 
Among the potential solutions to this problem, three seem 
especially promising.172 One is to project the costs and income 
curves of individual landmarks to arrive at a date in the future 
when those curves are likely to intersect. The owner of the land­
mark could be given the option at that date either of continuing 
to operate the building or of turning it over to the city. Acquisi­
tion costs then would be nominal because of the landmark site's 
lack of development potential and the further age of the building. 
The city could use the building for its own space needs or lease 
it to a suitable tenant who desires the prestige of a landmark 
location.173 The second is to devise appropriate subsidies for 
172 The Department of Housing and Urban Development has awarded a demon­
stration grant to the National Trust for Historic Preservation to examine the 
general applicability of the transfer proposal in the United States. A major con­
cern of this broader study, which is being directed by the author of this article, 
is the problem of duration discussed in the text. 
173 Numerous illustrations of this possibility are recounted in Dollars and Sense : 
Preservation Economics, HIST. PRESERVATION, Apr.-June 1971,  at 15. See also N.Y. 
Times, Aug. 12, 1971 at 1 , col. 1 ,  for an account of  the plans to rent the Villard 
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landmark owners out of monies generated by the development 
rights bank. The third is to seek an institutional buyer, such as a 
college or other nonprofit organization, to acquire the building 
after its development rights have been transferred. Developers 
and speculators will probably not wish to retain the building after 
that point, and the buyer will be in a position to acquire it at a 
favorable price. 
C. Development Rights Transfers 
The Chicago Plan contemplates a two-level system of bulk 
zoning regulation - development rights purchasers are permitted 
to build larger structures than the other lot owners in a develop­
ment rights transfer district. The legal issues inherent in this 
disparate treatment will be addressed in this section, examining, 
first, challenges based on the uniformity provisions of state 
zoning acts and the equal protection clauses of the federal and 
applicable state constitutions, and, second, objections grounded 
in issues o f  substantive due process . 
1. "Uniformity" as a Statutory and Constitutional Restraint. 
- The question whether application of a dual standard of bulk 
regulation to lots within a transfer district denies uniform treat­
ment to property owners within the district may be posed in 
either statutory or constitutional terms. The relevant statutory 
text is the requirement of most state zoning enabling acts that 
" [a]  ll [ zoning] regulations shall be uniform for each class or 
kind of buildings throughout each district." 174 The governing 
constitutional principle is the equal protection requirement of 
the federal 175 and applicable state constitutions. 
As seen above,176 the Chicago Plan could be implemented ex­
clusively through a preservation enabling act. There are, how­
ever, compelling reasons for analyzing the legal issues inherent in 
the Plan's two-level system of bulk regulation through examining 
judicial interpretations of the uniformity requirement of state 
zoning enabling acts. In the first place, it is doubtful whether the 
preservation enabling legislation of any state,177 Illinois excepted, 
Houses, designated New York landmarks, to a "conservative commercial firm that 
will use and maintain them in a style befitting a landmark." 
174 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ZONING, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD 
STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT UNDER WHICH MUNICIPALITIES MAY ADOPT ZONING 
REGULATIONS § 2 (rev. ed. 192 6) . 
175 U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § r .  
176 See p. 601 supra. 
177 While not expressly authorizing municipalities to engage in such programs, 
the following state preservation enabling acts contain grants of power that may 
be of sufficient breadth to warrant such a construction. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3 7361 
(West 1968) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2 1-4 ( 1968) . A less affirmative but po5.5ibly 
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authorizes the use of transfers as a means of safeguarding land­
marks. Thus communities that wish to avoid the problem of 
securing amendments to that legislation must look to their zoning 
enabling acts as the basis for their power to authorize develop­
ment rights transfers. Second, zoning precedents offer the most 
useful basis for predicting the likely judicial reaction to the trans­
fer technique even if it is implemented under preservation en­
abling statutes. If transfers pass muster under zoning precedents, 
they would undoubtedly be v alid under a properly drafted pres­
ervation statute as well. Finally, commentators are in general 
agreement that the statutory requirement of uniformity dupli­
cates the constitutional requirement of equal protection.178 
Hence, if the transfers of development rights do not run afoul of 
the uniformity requirement, it would appear that these transfers 
would survive the equal protection challenge as well. 
At first blush, the uniformity requirement seems to present an 
obstacle to the legality of the Chicago Plan : regulations for build­
ings within a development rights transfer district are not uniform 
in the sense that purchasers of development rights can build to 
greater bulk than other property owners within the district. This 
reading of the uniformity requirement, however, ignores the 
growing recognition of urban planners and municipal govern­
ments that in many cases the individual lot is not the appropriate 
unit of development control, and the corresponding willingness 
of the courts to interpret the uniformity requirement so as not 
to foreclose alternative  planning methods.179 
useful basis for implementing the proposal might be found in the language of many 
state preservation enabling acts authorizing local preservation commissions to de­
vise an "economically feasible plan" to safeguard threatened landmarks in private 
ownership. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 8.09 (Interim Supp. 1 9 70) ; 
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 399.205 (4) (Supp. 197 1 ) .  
178 The chief draftsman of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act has written 
that the purpose of the uniformity requirement is "to make it understood that 
all property situated alike shall be treated alike." E. BASSETT, ZONING 50 (1940) . 
See, e.g., Haar, "In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan," 68 HARV. L. REv. 
rr54, n 72 (1955 ) .  Significantly, the uniformity provision has most frequently 
been invoked in the spot-zoning context - where a small tract is zoned differently 
from its surrounding area. See, e.g., B artram v. Zoning Comm'n, 136 Conn. 89,  
68 A.2d 308 (1949) ; Cassel v.  Mayor & City Council, 195 Md. 348, 73 A.2d 486 
(1950) . Spot zoning, however, raises the statutory issue of conformity with a 
"comprehensive plan" and the constitutional issue of equal protection. See Haar, 
supra. It does not put in issue the statutory requirement of uniformity, which, 
by the terms of the zoning enabling act, relates only to the manner in which 
regulations are applied within the same zoning district. 
179 At least four factors account for the current disrepute , among land use 
scholars and local governments, of the premise that the individual lot should 
serve as the unit of development control. First, it hampers sound planning on a 
community-wide basis and promotes sterile design on individual sites. Second, it 
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Virtually every major innovation in the land use field over 
the last fifteen years rejects the notion that individual lots must 
serve as the unit of development control.180 Two of these innova­
tions - density zoning and the special development district -
are of particular relevance to the question whether development 
transfers conflict with the uniformity requirement:  they provide 
the twin pillars upon which the development rights transfer ele­
ment of the Chicago Plan is founded. Rejecting the individual 
lot as the unit of bulk control, density zoning 181 substitutes entire 
areas of the community in its place. It prescribes a maximum 
amount or range of bulk for an area as a whole, and permits 
developers to concentrate bulk there in accordance with flexible 
site planning or urban design criteria. Typically, density zones 
are overlay districts that include one or more traditional bulk 
zones within their boundaries. Developers may elect to build 
under the bulk regulations of the density zone or under those of 
the residual bulk zone. 
The special development district 182 complements density 
zoning by particularizing the development goals that will guide 
the distribution or redistribution of bulk within a density zone. 
A special development district is established only after a munici­
pality has evaluated the special functions or needs of the geograph­
ic area in question, and selected the goals that will channel devel­
opment or redevelopment there. In most cases, these goals are 
assumes that development still occurs on a lot-by-lot basis rather than on large 
landholdings, as in urban renewal areas and on the metropolitan fringe. Third, 
it fails to take account of the special needs and functions of a community's unique 
areas and to protect these areas from the destructive impact of private market 
decisions. Finally, it prevents communities from enhancing their amenity levels 
generally by means of incentive zoning programs such as those described in this 
article. See, e.g., E.  LOVELACE & W. WEISMANTEL, DENSITY ZONING: ORGANIC 
ZONING: ORGANIC ZONING FOR PLANNED RESIDENTIAL DEVEWPMENT (Urban Land 
Institute, Technical Bull. No. 4 2 ,  1 9 6 1 ) ; NEw ZONING passim ; Goldston & Scheuer, 
Zoning of Planned Residential Developments, 73 HARV. L. REV. 24I (1959) ; 
Symposium, Planned Unit Development, 1 1 4  U. PA. L. REV. l (1965 ) . 
180 Among these developments are expanded use of the variance and special 
exception, and innovations such as floating zones, cluster zones, planned unit de­
velopments, overlay districts, and special development districts. Accounts of the 
evolution of 'these techniques may be found in authorities cited note 1 7 9  supra. 
1 8 1  See authorities cited note l 79 supra. 
182 For discussions of special development districts see, e.g., Fonoroff, Special 
Districts: A Departure from the Concept of Uniform Controls, in NEW ZONING 
82 ; Huxtable, A Solid Dross City?, N.Y. Times, Mar. I4, 1 9 7 1 ,  § 2 ,  at 16,  col. 5 ;  
Huxtable, supra note 13. Examples of special development districts include the 
New York Special Theater District, see note r o  supra ; Fifth Avenue Retail Dis­
trict, see note 12 supra ; and the Special Greenwich Street Development District, 
see note 13 supra. 
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incorporated into a detailed area plan that itself is coordinated 
with the community's comprehensive plan. 
A development rights transfer district is, in effect, a special 
development district in which bulk is redistributed in accordance 
with the density zoning technique. It encompasses an area of the 
community that is unique because of the concentr ation there of 
many of the community's landmark buildings. The community's 
goal in establishing the transfer district, of course, is to safeguard 
the landmarks within the district from destruction. The detailed 
plan that the landmark and planning commissions draw up for 
the district is the product of exhaustive studies by both agencies 
that inventory the landmark buildings there, identify the bound­
aries within which transfers may be made, and coordinate bulk 
concentrations within the district with the community's overall 
development program. Bulk is allocated within the transfer dis­
trict on an area-wide rather than lot-by-lot basis because land­
mark lots must remain underimproved while lots utilizing the 
transferred development rights must be allowed to exceed the 
bulk limitations that are prescribed for individual lots in the 
traditional bulk zones within the district. The regulations o f  the 
residual bulk zone are superseded when the local governing 
body approves development rights transfer authorizations recom­
mended by the landmark commission. 
Judicial reaction to challenges to density zoning measures 
under the uniformity requirement augur well for the Chicago 
Plan : no density zoning measure that has come before the courts 
to date has been invalidated on the ground that it denies uniform 
treatment to affected property owners.183 Challenges to these 
183 See, e.g., Orinda Homeowners Comm. v. Board of Supervisors, I I  Cal. 
App. 3d 768, 90 Ca!.. Rptr. 88 ( 1970) ; Chrinko v. South Brunswick Tp. Planning 
Bd., 77 N.J . Super., 594, 187  A.2d 2 2 1  (L. Div. 1 963 ) ; Cheney v. Village 2 at 
New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 (1968) ; cf. Millbrae Ass'n for Residen­
tial Survival v. City of Millbrae, 262 Cal. App. 2d 2 2 2 ,  242-43, 69 Cal. Rptr. 251,  
265-66 ( 1968) (dictum) . 
The rock on which some density zoning ordinances have foundered has not 
been the uniformity objection but the challenge of improper delegation of legis­
lative power. See, e.g., Millbrae Ass'n for Residential Survival v. City of Millbrae, 
supra ; Hiscox v. Levine, 3 1  Misc. 2d 1 5 1 ,  21 6 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. 1 96 1 ) .  See 
generally Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit Development :  A Challenge to Established 
Legal Theory and Practice of Land Use Control, n4 U. PA. L. REV. 47 ( 1 965) ; 
Mandelker, Delegatiot.i of Power and Function in Zoning Administration, 1 963 
WASH. L.Q. 60 (1963 ) .  Although the decisions are hardly consistent, compare 
Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc., supra, with Hiscox v. Levine, supra, some 
courts have invalidated these measures on the ground that the regulation of bulk 
and area requirements on a district-wide basis is a legislative function that cannot 
be delegated to a planning commission, an administrative agency. See, e.g., Mill­
brae Ass'n for Residential Survival v. City of Millbrae, supra. 
HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 : 574 
measures have arisen in the context of two distinct applications 
o f  the density zoning technique : cluster zoning and planned unit 
development (PUD ) . Cluster zoning o rdinances offer the de­
veloper a trade : if he agrees to devote a prescribed percentage 
o f  this tract to a community use, such as a park or a school­
ground, he is authorized in return to build the same number of 
residential units on the remaining portion of his tract that he 
formerly could have built on the tract as a whole.184 PUD ordi­
nances go further by relaxing building type and use restrictions 
as well as area restrictions : single family, multifamily, and high­
rise units, and residential, commercial, and light industrial uses 
- all of which are segregated within separate districts under 
traditional zoning - o ften may be included within a single zone 
under these ordinances.185 
The courts have expressly held that both types of ordinances 
will meet the uniformity requirement if they entitle all property 
owners within the cluster or PUD district to take advantage of 
the opportunity to develop their parcels in accordance with the 
flexible density, building type, or use requirements of these ordi­
nances. 1 86 Rejecting a uniformity objection to a cluster ordi­
nance, for example, a New Jersey appellate court held in Chrinko 
v. South Brunswick Township Planning Board 187 that the clus­
tering technique "accomplishes uniformity because the option 
is open to all developers within a zoning district." 188 Chrinko 
echoes a number o f  earlier, nondensity zoning cases in empha­
sizing that the uniformity required by statute refers not to the 
end product of the development decisions within the district -
in Chrinko,  the minimum lot size of the dwellings actually con­
structed there - but to uniform application of the regulation to 
all landowners within the district.189 
Since the Chicago Plan vests approval for transfers in the local legislative body, 
rather than in the planning commission, it will be immune from delegation prob­
lems that have afflicted other density transfer measures. 
184 See URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, NEW APPROACHES TO RESIDENTIAL LAND DE­
VELOPMENT (Tech. Bull. No. 40, 1961) ; w. WHYTE, CLUSTER DEVELOPMENT 
( 1 964 ) .  Representative state and local cluster provisions are collected in W. 
WHYTE, supra, at apps. B & C. 
185 See, e.g., Goldston & Scheuer, supra note 1 79, at 255-62 (1959) ; Symposium, 
supra note l 79. 
186 See, e.g., Orinda Homeowners Comm. v. Board of Supervisors, II Cal. 
App. 3d 768, 90 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1 970) ; Chrinko v. South B runswick Tp. Plan­
ning Bd., 77  N.J. Super. 594, 187 A.2d 2 2 1  (L. Div. 1963 ) ; Cheney v. Village 2 
at New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 ( 1 968 ) .  
1 87 77  N.J . Super. 594, 1 8 7  A.2d 2 2 1  ( L .  Div. 1963 ) .  
188 Id. at 601 , 187 A.2d at 2 2 5 .  
189 See, e.g., Greenpoint Sav. Bank v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 281 N.Y. 534, 
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The same rationale appears in Orinda Homeowners Commit­
tee v. Board of Supervisors,190 which upheld a PUD ordinance 
against a claim of nonuniform application of district regulations 
concerning building types : 
A residential planned unit development . . .  does not conflict 
with [the uni formity provision] merely by reason of the fact 
that the units are not uniform, that is, they are not all single 
family dwellings and perhaps the multi- family units differ among 
themselves. [The uniformity provision ] provides that the regu­
lations shall be uniform for each class or kind of building or use 
of land throughout the zone. It does not state that the units 
must be alike even as to their character, whether single family 
or multi-family.191 
The uniformity problem is somewhat more complicated than 
the stated rationale in Chrinko ,  Orinda and related cases indi­
cates because access to the benefits of cluster or PUD ordinances 
is normally limited to owners of sizeable parcels.192 However, 
neither uniformity nor its constitutional equivalent, equal pro­
tection, would appear to be violated by the size criterion. Dis­
criminations among the members of a regulated class are permis­
sible if they can be reasonably grounded in the purpose of the 
underlying regulation.198 Since the principal objective of both 
cluster and PUD ordinances is to promote large-scale develop­
ments of attractive design, limiting the benefits of these ordi­
nances to developers with substantial land holdings would appear 
to meet this test.194 
540, 24 N.E.2d 319, 322  (1 939) ,  appeal dismissed, 309 U.S. 633 ( 1 940) ; Mandis 
v. Gorski, 24 App. Div. 2d r8r, r86, 265 N.Y.S .2d 2 10, 216 (1 965) .  
190 n Cal. App. 3d 768, 90 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1 970) . 
191 Id. at 773, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 90-91 .  
192 See, e.g., id. ( 187  acres) ; Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 
626, 241 A.2d Sr (1 968) ("a large tract of land") . 
1 93 See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961 ) ; Goesaert v. Cleary, 
336 U.S. ro6 ( 1949 ) .  More rigorous review has been applied when "fundamental 
interests" or "suspect classifications" are involved. See Developments in the Law 
- Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, ro87-u32 (1969) . However, strict 
review does not appear to apply to wealth classifications by themselves. See p. 
627 infra. 
194 Whether the uniformity provision is even applicable to bulk or area regu­
lations is dubious. On its face, it appears to deal only with use restrictions. See 
p. 620 supra. But see IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-75 5 ( 1 )  ( 1 964) : 
Regulations as to height, area, bulk and use of buildings and as to the area 
of yards, courts and open spaces shall be uniform for each class of buildings 
throughout each district. (Emphasis added.) 
At least one court has held the uniformity requirement inapplicable to bulk re­
strictions. See Scrut'ton v. County of Sacramento, 2 75 ·Cal. App. 2d 412 ,  418, 
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These density zoning precedents strongly indicate that the 
development rights transfer component of  the Chicago Plan will 
not fall before the objection that it denies uniform treatment to 
lot owners within a transfer district. By providing for the dis­
posal of development rights through appropriate public bidding 
and sale procedures, the Plan will insure that all district owners 
have access to the purchase and enjoyment of  development rights . 
This is not to say, of  course, that some lot owners may not enjoy 
greater advantages than others as a result of the Plan. The con­
figuration of particular lots may be such that the acquisition of 
additional development rights would carry no economic benefit 
for their owners.195 Since the demand for the rights will probably 
exceed the available supply at any given time, 196 many lot owners 
will lack the financial resources to acquire these rights at pre­
vailing market prices. But these or similar impediments to prac­
tical as opposed to formal access attend any program in which 
surplus public property is disposed of by public sale and bidding 
procedures. Moreover, though the benefits of  cluster and PUD 
zoning are limited to owners of  large acreage, and thus possibly 
to a wealthier class o f  developers, this has not deterred judicial 
acceptance of these plans. A uniformity challenge to the Chicago 
Plan, based on the fact that the bidding technique for disposal 
o f  transfer rights favors wealthier bidders, would thus seem 
unlikely to succeed . 
Finally, the Chicago Plan is likely to encounter even less 
judicial resistance under the uniformity requirement than PUD 
ordinances and other forms of  innovative zoning that mix diverse 
building types and uses. Use zoning has traditionally proven 
more controversial than bulk zoning because of its more imme­
diate impact upon surrounding property.197 The increasing wil­
lingness of American courts to approve the mi:Xture of uses and 
building types once thought incompatible 198 offers strong evi-
7 9  Cal. Rptr. 872 ,  877  ( 1969) . Numerous others have implied this result. See, 
e.g., Rockhill v. Township of Chesterfield, 23 N.J . n7,  1 26, 1 2 8  A.2d 473, 478 
( 1957) ; Schmidt v. Board, 9 N,J. 405, 417,  88 A.2d 607, 6 12-13 ( 1952 ) ; Walker 
v. Elkin, 2 5 4  N.C. 85, n8 S.E.2d l ( 1961 ) .  These decisions appear to recognize 
that use zoning has a more immediate impact upon community welfare than bulk 
o r  area zoning. Hence, they do not insist that the latter secure mathematical 
uniformity, but seem willing to approve the flexible application of bulk or area 
regulations even in traditional bulk zones. 
195 As lot size decreases, higher construction becomes unprofitable because a 
substantial portion of a building's interior space must be given over to its elevator 
core and mechanical systems. 
196 See Chicago Report 16-19. 
197 Cf. Heyman, Innovative Land Regulation and Comprehensive Planning, 
in NEW ZONING 23.  
198 See, e.g., Millbrae Ass'n for Residential Survival v. City of Millbrae, 262 
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dence that the marginal bul k  adjustments permitted under the 
Chicago Plan wil l  not be found offensive by the courts. 
The Chicago Plan appears equally able to surmount any di­
rect equal protection challenge to its transfer feature. Recent 
Supreme Court decisions have suggested that the mere fact that 
a law works to the disadvantage of less wealthy individuals does 
not cal l for more than a rational basis for the state's actions.199 
This basis is present in the Chicago Plan:  by selling development 
rights at the highest possible price, the city maximizes the rev­
enues it has available for the operation of its landmark preserva­
tion program. 
Basing the development rights transfer component of the 
Chicago Plan on the density zoning precedents above carries 
the additional advantage of differentiating transfers from the 
traditional zoning variance. At  first blush, the two may be con­
fused because both enable their recipients to erect larger build­
ings than are permitted by the regulations of the bulk zone in 
which the buildings wil l  be located. A court that identified a 
development rights transfer with a variance, however, would 
probably invalidate the transfer because transfer authorizations 
are not administered by the board of zoning appeals and are 
not granted on the basis of economic hardship, as required for 
variances by most zoning enabling acts.200 But the right o f  the 
development rights purchaser to build to greater bulk originates 
in the bulk regulations applicable to the transfer district, and 
hence is substitutive of, rather than a variation from, the regu­
lations of the traditional bulk zone. This right, moreover, is 
founded on the planning considerations that support density 
zoning generally, not on grounds of special hardship. 
The transfer authorization and the variance are not wholly 
unrelated, however. The administration of variances by lay 
Cal. App. 2d 2 2 2 ,  69 Cal. Rptr. 251 ( I 968) ; Hiscox v. Levine, 3 I  Misc. 2d gr, 
216 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct .  I961 ) .  
'99 See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 ( I 9 7I ) ; Dandridge v .  Williams, 
397 U.S. 471 (1970) . See Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educ�tional Opportunity : 
A Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures, 5 7  CALIF. L .  REV. 
305, 349 (I969) . 
An equal protection challenge to the Chicago Plan should be distinguished 
from equal protection challenges to government zoning practices that have the 
effect of pricing housing in a given community out of the reach o f  low-income 
groups. This practice, referred to as "exclusionary zoning," has aroused the in­
creasing concern of commentators, see, e.g., Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal 
Protection, 84 HARV. L. REV. I645 (197 1 ) .  Unlike exclusionary zoning, the Chicago 
Plan appears to have no differential impact on the housing of low-income groups. 200 s ee, e.g., ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ZoNING, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra 
note 174, § 7 ;  CAL. Gov'T CODE § 659o6 (Wes·t I966) . 
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boards has been roundly condemned on all sides 201 because these 
boards, whether through incompetence or outright corruption, 
have freely granted variances with little regard for the statutory 
requirement of economic hardship. Municipalities that adopt the 
Chicago Plan can restore the variance to its proper role by re­
quiring developers who seek bulk variances on spurious grounds 
to purchase development rights from landmark owners or from 
the municipal development rights bank. 
2. Substantive Due Process as a Constraint Upon Transfer 
Authorizations. - Of the various obstacles to public and judicial 
acceptance of  development rights transfer programs such as the 
Chicago Plan, none looms larger than the specter of urban de­
sign abuse that critics of these programs have raised. For ex­
ample, Beverly Moss Spatt, as a member o f  the New York City 
Planning Commission, denounced that city's landmarks transfer 
program as a "gimmick" that "can only lead to an unplanned 
future - to chaos ." 202 
The argument implicit in this charge cannot be easily dis­
missed. The greater bulk authorizations permitted for transferee 
sites under the program do appear to call into question the rea­
sonableness either o f  the community's existing zoning plan or 
of  the transfer program. I f  the existing zoning is sound, it may 
be claimed, relaxing bulk restrictions on transferee sites will 
overload public services and distort the urban landscape, there­
by producing the planning chaos of which Mrs. Spatt warns. 
I f  it is too stringent, the proper course is to raise prevailing 
bulk limitations within the area generally and, in the process, 
to remove unwarranted public restrictions on the rights of prop­
erty owners there. But, the argument proceeds, a program that 
retains existing bulk levels for most property owners while re­
laxing them for development rights purchasers sacrifices sound 
zoning and planning to short-term fiscal advantage. Hence, it is 
an arbitrary exercise of the police power, condemned under the 
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.203 
This argument fundamentally misconceives the process by 
2 0 1  See, e.g., R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 7 ( 1966) ; S. ToLL, ZONED 
AMERICAN 184 ( 1 969) ; Dukeminier & Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment : 
A Case Study in Misrule, 50 KY. L .J. 2 73 ( 1 962 ) .  
202 Dissent from Resolution CP-2 n66 of the New York City Planning Com­
mission to the Board of Estimate, May 13,  1 9 70. 
203 See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272  U.S. 365, 395 (1926) 
(zoning ordinances arc valid unless shown to be "clearly arbitrary and unreason­
able" ) .  One commentator has summarized the current content of the due process 
challenge to zoning regulations as follows: 
[W]here a zoning ordinance is challenged on the ground that it takes 
property without due process of law, [a court] will consider: ( 1 )  the im­
pact of the restriction upon the land of the plaintiff (How serious is the 
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which bulk levels are determined and the functions that they 
serve. As a r�sult, it invests the numbers in the zoning code 
with an aura of scientific exactitude that is largely without 
foundation in fact. The precision that is attainable in setting 
bulk limitations in the downtown commercial and high-rise resi­
dential zones that will be included in transfer districts under the 
Chicago Plan turns upon the purposes that these l imitations are 
designed to achieve. Among these purposes are the following : 
regulating population ; insuring an adequate amount of light, air, 
and open space ; rationing demands upon public services and fa­
cilities ; and accommodating market demands for new office and 
residential space.204 
The process by which these objectives are translated into 
numbers is among the most complex in the urban design field. 205 
It proceeds on at least two levels : fact determination and political 
judgment. The facts that must be established or projected, such 
as the correlation of population increments with demands upon 
public facilities or the capacity of the market to absorb a stated 
amount of office space over a given period, are often elusive and 
inevitably tentative.206 Political judgment must be exercised in 
selecting the desired development objectives for specific areas 
of the city and in resolving conflicts that may be inherent in these 
objectives. For example, the bulk levels that will satisfy demands 
for office space in a booming economy may clash with those that 
are thought appropriate for the particular city's aesthetic char­
acter.207 Such clashes are unscrambled, not on the planner's slide 
rule, but in the political arena 208 and, in some instances, in public 
referenda as well .  209 
deprivation attributable to the ordinance ? )  ; ( 2 )  the objective of the re­
striction (Is it intended to serve the public health, safety, morals, or the 
general welfare ?) ; and (3) the reasonableness of the restriction (Do the 
means selected have a rational tendency to achieve the objective ? ) .  
Anderson, A Comment on the Fine Line Between "Regulation" and "Taking," in 
NEW ZONING 66, 70. The due process challenge discussed in text relates primarily 
to the last consideration enumerated by Anderson. 
204 See authorities cited note 43 supra. 
205 Accounts of this process may be found in, e.g., G. FORD, BUILDING HEIGHT, 
BULK AND FORM (Harvard City Planning Studies II, 193 1 ) ; S. TOLL, supra note 
20r, at r6r-66 ; Randall, The Question of Size: A Re-approach to the Study of 
Zoning, 54 ARCH. F. n7 ( 1 93 1 ) .  
For excellent analyses o f  the process b y  which the City o f  San Francisco 
arrived at the bulk levels of its present zoning ordinance, see Ruth, supra note 69 ; 
Svirsky, supra note 6. 
206 See authorities cited notes 43 & 205 supra. 
207 Members of the real estate industry have expressed the view that contem­
porary zoning impairs downtown development by overemphasizing requirements 
of light, air, and open space in central areas. See, e.g., OFFICES 280-81 ; Air Rights 
497. 
208 See S. TOLL, supra note 201, passim. 
209 Objecting to the "Manhattanization" of their skyline resulting from in-
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The specific bulk levels that emerge from this two-step proc­
ess fall considerably short of  Platonic absolutes, the slightest 
deviation from which threatens the dire planning consequences 
predicted by Mrs. Spatt.210 Were it not for the risk of discrimi­
natory official action,211 in fact, it would be far less arbitrary to 
express bulk levels in terms o f  a range o f  integers rather than 
as fixed integers. 212 Whether office buildings in the downtown 
section of  a major city are permitted to go to sixty-five rather 
than sixty-two stories, after all, is not an issue of great moment. 
What is critical, however, is that this range of stories - or its 
equivalent in terms o f  F AR's - accurately reflects the develop­
ment objectives that the city seeks to achieve in its downtown 
section. 
On the basis of  this analysis, the charge that the Chicago 
Plan fosters arbitrary zoning should be rejected since the bulk 
increments allotted to development rights purchasers fall within 
a range that is defensible in planning terms. The reasonableness 
of  deviations under the Chicago Plan from preexisting bulk regu­
lations is not called into doubt by the presumed soundness of these 
regulations : the net increases, i f  any,213 in overall density in the 
district under the Chicago Plan will not be enough to bring the 
overall density of the district outside that range originally decided 
upon, and the increases in bulk on individual transferee lots will 
not be arbitrary in planning terms.214 The argument that builders 
creased bulk levels adopted in I96I , an organization of San Franciscans succeeded 
in having submitted to referendum a proposition that would have required spe­
cific voter approval of the construction of any building over six stories or 72 feet. 
The proposition was defeated. N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 197I ,  at 36, col. 1 .  
2 10 In an exhaustive examination of the problem of the optimum size of 
down.town structures, one commentator concluded: 
Conclusive quantitative proof of the desirability of these things [sunlight, 
air, etc.] is almost impossible, as is also the setting up of any unqualified 
standard for safety and well-being below which we should not go. The 
general indications would lead to the belief that, while sunlight, air, out­
look, privacy, the avoidance of a sense of "shut-in-ness" and of actual con­
gestion are highly desirable, we are not able to set up a minimum which, 
let us say, if curtailed by IO per cent would spell disaster or if augmented 
by I o  per cent would spell relative happiness and prosperity. 
Randall, supra note 205,  at 1 1 7 ;  see S. TOLL, supra note 20I , at I37 ·  
2 1 1  Professor Mandelker has noted that "conventional l o t  regulations are uti­
lized because they simplify the problems of control.'' Mandelker, Reflections on 
the American System of Planning Controls : A Response to Professor Krasnowiecki, 
1 14 u. PA. L. REV. 98, I OI (I965 ) .  
212 One interesting attempt at expressing density for individual parcels on the 
basis of a sliding scale of integers is the Land Use Intensity system described in 
Hanke, Planned Unit Development and Land Use Intensity, 114 U .  PA. L. REV. 
I 5 ,  2 2-30 ( 1965) . 
213 See notes 7I & 72 supra. 
214 See p. 590 & note 55 supra. 
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who do not purchase development rights are sufferi ng unconstitu­
tional encroachments upon their right to develop their property 
is equally unsound. If all builders in  the development rights 
district were allowed to exceed the original bulk restrictions, then 
the increase in bulk would exceed the range that had been pre­
viously decided upon. 
There is good reason to believe that the courts will accept 
this analysis and uphold the Plan against the due process at­
tack. Judicial approval of density zoning 215 implies acceptance 
of the principle that a community may prescribe multiple densi­
ties for individual lots as long as a sound planning rationale 
supports this decision. Moreover, the courts have traditionally 
accorded wide deference to legislative economic measures that 
are challenged on substantive due process groun ds.216 In the 
land use field, the American judiciary has proven especially 
responsive to the efforts of local governments to meet pressing 
development needs,217 and, since 1926,218 has approved a broad 
array of innovative measures that, like the Chicago Plan, prom­
ised to enhance community welfare.219 In light of  this fact, i t  
seems most unlikely that the courts would undertake to second­
guess either the wisdom or the arithmetic 220 of a community's 
transfer program if the latter is rooted in careful planning studies 
of the kind envisaged in the Chicago Plan.221 
21s See cases cited note 183 supra. 
216 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 3 79 ( 1 93 7 ) ; Nebbia v. 
New York, 291 U.S. 502 ( 1 934) . 
217 See Anderson, supra note 203, at 75 ; cf. D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING 
AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 75-76 (1971 ) ; Heyman, supra note 197,  
at 40, 51-52 . 
218 The United States Supreme Court upheld zoning as a constitutional exer­
cise of the police power that year in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 2 7 2  
U.S. 3 6 5  (1926 ) .  Prior to this decision, substantial conflict existed among the 
state courts concerning the constitutionality of zoning. See Cribbet, Changing 
Concepts in the Law of Land Use, 50 IOWA L. REV. 245, 257 (196 7 ) .  
219 See, e.g., Orinda Homeowners Comm. v. Board of Supervisors, n Cal. App. 
3d 768, 90 Cal. Rptr. 88 (Ct. App. 1 9 70) (PUD zoning) ; Beall v. Montgomery 
County Counci.I, 240 Md. 77,  212 A.2d 751 ( 1965) (floating zoning) ; Bucholz 
v. Omaha, 1 74 Neb. 862 ,  120  N.W.2d 2 70 (1963 ) ( conditional zoning) ; Chrinko 
v. South Brunswick Tp. Planning Bd., 77 N.J. Super. 594, 187 A.2d 2 2 1  (L. Div. 
1963) (cluster zoning) . 
220 On the basis of an exhaustive review of bulk zoning decisions, one com­
mentator has concluded that " [s] o far, courts have shown a healthy respect for 
the figures arrived at after careful research and planning." Note, supra note 43, 
at 512.  
221 The importance of thorough, well-documented planning studies in with­
�tanding due process as well as equal protection and spot-zoning challenges to 
mnovative measures has been stressed in a comprehensive analysis of  incentive 
zoning measures prepared by Professor Heyman. See Heyman, supra note 1 9 7 ,  
Passim. The recurring thesis o f  the Heyman study provides additional support for 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Despite their apparent novelty, the principal features of the 
Chicago Plan are solidly grounded in precedents derived from 
the areas of condemnation, property, and land use law. Public 
programs in which government resells or leases condemned inter­
ests in order to recapture program costs are commonplace today, 
as the byproduct, leasing, and urban renewal cases discussed 
earlier illustrate.222 Similarly, government, whether with or with­
out clear statutory authority, has acquired some portion of the 
development potential of private property for any number of 
reasons including open space preservation,223 highway beautifica­
tion,224 and even use zoning based on eminent domain rather than 
the police power.225 Finally, local governments in recent years 
have employed their land use powers imaginatively to secure de­
sired patterns of community development in areas other than 
landmark preservation. Density zoning (which underpins PUD 
and cluster zones) ,  special development districts, and a variety 
of other measures that duplicate or surpass development rights 
transfers in the degree of their departure from traditional zon­
ing have been sanctioned in numerous decisions of state courts.226 
Taken collectively, these precedents should provide a firm ba­
sis for judicial approval of the Chicago Plan. The prospects for 
the Plan's success in court would be even further improved by 
an assist from state legislatures. Either o f  two types of legisla­
tion should prove sufficient. The first, adopted in Illinois,227 
would provide in a single enactment an independent statutory 
foundation for each of the Plan's three principal features : the 
condemnation and resale o f  development rights, the acquisition 
of preservation restrictions, and the transfer of development 
rights within transfer districts. The second would proceed more 
modestly against the backdrop of existing statute and case law, 
providing legislative sanction only for particular features of the 
the position that the Chicago Plan will be upheld by the courts. As stated by 
Heyman : 
[The] courts should and will approve a flexible regulatory device where it 
is shown that its use sensibly relates to public objectives identified in ad­
vance in a planning process and is justified by a detailed explanation 
showing the actual relationship between the objective and the action. 
Id. at 40. 
222 See pp. 605-u supra. 
223 See WHYTE, supra note 13 7.  
224 See notes 13 7 & l 6 5-66 supra. 
225 See note 164 supra. 
226 See notes 183 & 219 supra. 
227 Ill. ·Pub. A. No. 77-1372 (Ill. Leg. Serv., Aug. 3 1 ,  1971 ) ,  in part to be 
codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § n-48.2-1A, in part amending !LL. REV. STAT. 
ch. 24, §§ 1 1-48.2-2 & -6 (1969) . 
LANDMARKS PRESERVATION 
Plan, such as the enforceability of preservation restrictions, which 
may be in doubt in a given jurisdiction.228 
The likelihood that the Chicago Plan will withstand judicial 
challenge, of course, does not of itself establish that it should 
be implemented by local governments. In the author's judgment, 
the truly hard questions posed by the Plan's adoption are not 
legal ones at all. Three of these questions bear special mention. 
First, are the risks of favoritism or worse that attend adminis­
tration of the Plan acceptable ones for communities that wish to 
preserve urban landmarks ? There is no easy answer to this 
question. The willingness of communities throughout the United 
States to adopt a wide variety of other innovative land use mea­
sures that carry equivalent or greater risks, however, suggests 
that the risk factor alone should not necessarily prove conclusive 
against the Plan. Second, can municipal planning agencies handle 
the urban design challenges that they will confront in establish­
ing development rights transfer districts and in supervising the 
other planning controls in the Chicago Plan? While the unhap­
py history of zoning bonuses in some cities gives cause for hesi­
tation,229 the grim prospects for the nation's remaining urban 
landmarks if nothing is done must also be weighed in the bal­
ance. 
Finally, the impact of the Plan on the community's other 
incentive programs and development goals must be scrutinized. 
In a stagnant real estate market, for example, the development 
rights made available under the Plan may undermine the value 
of development rights offered to builders under other incentive 
programs. Again, the community's other development goals , 
which may include, for example, increasing the supply of resi­
dential units, will be deterred to the extent that the city requires 
builders to purchase development rights rather than directly 
relaxes the bulk levels permitted as of right in the pertinent 
228 See pp. 611-17 supra. 
229 Zoning bonuses were originally conceived for the laudable purpose of rais­
ing urban amenity levels by encouraging light, air, and circulation in downtown 
areas. Abetted by high land and construction costs and allocated on an overly 
generous basis, however, they have threatened or destroyed the diversity and 
vitality of these areas in some instances . Ada Louis Huxtable's description of their 
impact upon the redevelopment of New York's Sixth Avenue is vivid and bleak : 
The zoning is a failure in urbanistic terms - or how a city looks and 
works. The zoning, combined with the rising cost of land and building, has 
been the definitive factor in driving out the small enterprises, the shops, 
restau�ants .
and se
.rvices that make New York a decent and pleasurable pla�e m which to hve and work. In their place is a cold parade of standard ?usmess structures set back aimlessly from the street on blank plazas that 
ignore each other. 
Huxtable, Thinking Man's Zoning, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1 9 7 1 ,  § 2 ,  at 2 2 ,  col. l ;  
see Chicago Report 17 .  
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zones.230 Hence, in pondering the advisability of adopting the­
Chicago Plan or any other incentive program for that matter, 
the community must ask itself - incentives for what? Resolving 
this question requires frank recognition that landmark preserva­
tion must compete with other worthy candidates for favorable 
regulatory treatment. 
230 The conflict of goals portrayed in the text has arisen in New York City_ 
See Marcus. 
